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 Summary 
 
This research project deals with the topic of drinking water provision in rural Maharashtra, where 
availability of suitable drinking water is a major difficulty for the rural population. 
The focus is on hand pumps. These resource systems have been provided as tax financed public 
goods by the central government. The central government has shown insufficient capacity to 
maintain this infrastructure. In this thesis decentralization of management of the resource system is 
discussed. The aim of this study is to compare two water management regimes, the centralized 
government regime and a community based management regime. The purpose is to identify the key 
determinants for establishing sustainable drinking water management in rural Maharahstra. 
The theoretical approach is a comparative institutional analysis of two management regimes based 
on common pool resource theory. The study is mainly conducted through focus group interviews 
with users and village level administration in thirteen villages. Thus, the empirical material is mainly 
qualitative data. 
The conclusion is that the NGO´s approach is an example where social mobilization efforts have been 
successful in establishing a new institutional setting where local actors successfully manage their 
resource system.  This management regime appears preferable if one look to rural communities 
outside larger villages. In order to achieve this, a wider social mobilization effort in order to build 
social capital of the community is needed to secure sufficient participation. In these communities 
one can find ”social entrepreneurs”, people with leadership capacity and ideas about the 
development of their village, that will keep the user group active in maintenance if the level of social 
capital is sufficient.     
Finally, I found that letting users demand of maintenance capacity determine the amount of 
maintenance capacity supplied would probably increase the efficiency of the studied program and 
similar programs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key terms: Participation, Water management, Development economics, Common pool 
resource, Rural India. 
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Sammanfattning  
 
Tillgången på dricksvatten på den indiska landsbygden är ett problem. Framförallt saknar de 
fattigaste invånarna tillräcklig tillgång på rent dricksvatten.  Denna studie behandlar en del av denna 
problematik i delstaten Maharashtra. 
 
Under de senaste årtiondena har infrastruktur för vatten tillhandahållits av staten som 
skattefinansierade offentliga varor. Då statens kapacitet att underhålla dessa system brister är det 
intressant att se på alternativen. I denna uppsats diskuteras resultatet av decentralisering av 
förvaltning och ägande av dessa resurser genom aktivt brukardeltagande. 
Vattenförsörjningssystemet i byar där decentralisering genomförts, med hjälp av en ideell 
organisation, jämförs med situationen då staten äger och underhåller resurssystemet. Syftet med 
studien är att jämföra de två systemen och identifiera de faktorer som avgör om den nya 
förvaltningsregimen blir långsiktigt hållbar.  
 
Studien utgår från institutionell ekonomi och baseras på ”common-pool resourse” teori.  Den 
huvudsakliga metoden för datainsamling är fokusgrupper med brukare och den lokala 
administrationen i tretton byar. Således utgörs det empiriska materialet till största delen av kvalitativ 
data.   
 
Slutsatsen är att lokal förvaltning är att föredra om vi ser till fattiga samhällen utanför större byar på 
den indiska landsbygden. En extern aktör kan forma lokala institutioner, som ger långsiktigt hållbara 
system för underhåll av handpumpar i dessa samhällen.  För att lyckas med detta krävs tillräckligt 
brukardeltagande, inte att alla brukare deltar i underhåll. Vidare behövs förstärkning av det sociala 
kapitalet hos brukarna för att uppnå tillräckligt deltagande.  I samhällena finns ”sociala 
entreprenörer”, personer med ledaregenskaper och vilja att utveckla byn, som kommer att hålla 
brukarorganisationen igång förutsatt tillräckligt socialt kapital. 
  
Genom att låta den lokala efterfrågan inte bara styra antalet brunnar som installeras, utan även 
avgöra hur underhållskapaciteten byggs ut, borde effektiviteten i det studerade 
utvecklingsprogrammet och liknande program kunna ökas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nyckelord: Deltagande, Vatten, Utvecklingsekonomi, Landsbygdsutveckling, Indien.  
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1. Introduction 
The focus of this study is the question of how to ensure sustainable drinking water provision in rural India. 
People’s access to safe drinking water is crucial for economic development, development that means 
something more than economic growth. As economist Amartya Sen, a leading thinker on the meaning of 
development, claim: economic growth cannot be an end in itself. Instead he argues that capability to 
function is what really matters for status as a poor or non-poor person (Sen 1999, pp. 127-134).  Sen 
exemplifies this: someone with a parasitic disease, in comparison with a healthy person, will be less able to 
extract nourishment from a given quantity of food (ibid.). Thus income is not the only relevant 
measurement of economic development. Empirical evidence show that increased income does not 
automatically lead to health improvements (Todaro & Smith 2003, pp. 366-367). Unsafe drinking water is 
responsible for a substantial part of the disease
1
 burden in the world.  Waterborne diseases are responsible 
for 35 percent of the death of young children in Africa, Asia and Latin America, these would soon be 
eliminated with safe water supply (Todaro & Smith 2003, p. 55).  
In addition, it is also reasonable to believe that economic growth is hindered by lack of suitable drinking 
water through at least two channels (Todaro & Smith., p. 400). First, an unhealthy weak person is not as 
productive as a healthy stronger person. Second, long distances to access drinking water make women
2
 in 
developing countries spend several hours per day collecting water, time that could be spent more 
productively if water access was extended. Consumption of water also drops significantly when it has to be 
carried for more than a few minutes, which adds on the negative health effect (Sida 2004, p. 12). 
To improve the livelihoods of poor people one thus need to pay special attention to drinking water 
provision. Why water access to all has not been realized have some ecological explaining factors, but 
management issues seem to be at least equally important. Safe drinking water is a natural resource which, 
in many areas of the world, demands some technology to extract and with that comes some implications 
identified through economic theory. In economic terms the above described effect of higher consumption 
of good quality water could be regarded as positive “externalities” and the technology needed could have 
characteristics of “economics of scale”. Both these characteristics could give governments reason to 
intervene
3
.  
The donor community financing water programs support approaches to include the final users as important 
participants in water management (see e.g. World Bank 2007; Sida 2004). This is also supported by 
economic research (Finsterbush & Wicklin 1989
4
, Isham et. al. 1995, Isham & Kähkönen 2002) that 
measures correlation between participation activity and project results.  But economist are also aware that 
people trying to act together could be subject to “free-riding” problems and some scholars focus on what 
institutional factors that determine when local management of resources becomes sustainable and 
highlights the importance of adapting strategies suitable for the local circumstances (Baland & Platteau 
1996; Ostrom 1990; Wade 1988).     
                                                            
1 
Diarrhoea, dysentery, typhoid, worms, jaundice and cholera (Narain 2006, p. 2).   
2
 Women are the primary water collectors in most rural households (World Bank Group 2007). 
3
 These concepts will be developed later on in the thesis. 
4
 Not specific to the water sector. 
2 
  
This essay focuses on rural India. In 2004 more than 70 percent of India’s then 990 million people lived in 
half a million rural villages where waterborne diseases were a major health problem (Sida 2004, p. 10). This 
empirical case study covers a church based NGO, Hindustani Covenant Church (HCC), and this organisations 
involvement in drinking water management in the rural areas of western India in the state of Maharashtra. 
HCC organize and educate village people to participate in the process of installing new bore wells with hand 
pumps and repair old ones and then hand over the responsibility of maintenance to the local community.  
HCC is, expressed differently, pursuing a participatory strategy and this case study will focus on what can be 
learnt from this NGO regarding what practices gives effective sustainable community based drinking water 
management when replacing a government run, more centralized, water management regime in the same 
area. This paper examines the results of available academic experience of user participation in 
management in combination with the empirical investigation in Maharashtra. 
 
1.1 Aim 
The aim of this study is to compare two water management regimes, the centralized government regime 
and a community based management regime. The purpose is to identify the key determinants for 
establishing sustainable drinking water management in rural Maharahstra. It is a comparative institutional 
analysis which treats government run management as the prevailing institutional regime and the NGO 
activities as a shock
5
 to that system that will take it to a new institutional equilibrium
6
.  
In this paper I define sustainable drinking water management as when users are satisfied with the 
functioning of the hand pump and there exists an institution for maintenance of the hand pump some time 
after program implementation.  
The sub objectives are: 
to outline the institutional setting of the previous management regime 
to outline what type of user participation this particular NGO-program facilitates 
to explore what role area specific characteristics has in determining sustainability of a local 
management regime 
to determine the sustainability of the new management regime compared to the previous.  
to determine which the key elements are to establishing sustainable community based drinking 
water management in the area.  
 
                                                            
5
 I here use the term shock as it is used in the standard economic modelling sense, as a factor externally introduced affecting the 
modelled variables.  Previous use of similar vocabulary within CIA can be found in i.e.  Aoki (2005), p. 3. 
6
 By institutional equilibrium I mean when the agents new action become mutually consistent and repeatedly implementable (Aoki 
2005, p. 6)  
3 
  
 
1.2 Delimitations  
My focus is on drinking water management. This means I do not study water management in full; I do not 
include various types of water harvesting or water shed activities
7
. Neither are domestic waste water 
solutions nor other sanitation issues included in the study, even if those are important to be able to see 
positive results from the new bore well in terms of improved health. This because I chose to focus this 
study on factors that affect people’s participation in maintenance directly.  
Regarding drinking water provision I focus on institutions and incentives for management. This means I do 
not put that much attention to different technical solutions
8
 for provision of drinking water or geological, 
ecological and various other environmental aspects. I also choose to focus on the issue of the neediest 
people living scattered outside the villages or in hamlets in rural areas
9
.  
The introduction explains the importance of suitable drinking water as being one source for improved 
health and time saving on an unproductive activity for the rural women. This relationship is not studied in 
this paper, because I find it already established by previous research (Isham & Kähkönen 2002, p. 670; Sida 
1999)
10
. 
  
                                                            
7
 This is done, well aware of the policy consensus, stated in the Dublin principles, of the importance of Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM) to ensure sustainable and multifunctional use of fresh water resources (SIDA 1999, p. 1). The reason for this 
delimitation is to limit the complexity of multiple stakeholders so a reasonable research design can be established.  
8
 I focus on hand pump provision without putting into question if hand pumps are the best alternative. Kolsky et.al. (2000, p. 3) 
estimate, in their Indian study, hand pumps to be more cost-effective on per capita basis for communities with fewer than 4500 
people. Also other arguments speak in favour of hand pumps, e.g. Narain (2006, p. 8) has concluded that electricity pumps worsen 
the problem with lowering water table due to overuse. 
9
 See section 4.1 for an explanation on these concepts. 
10
 Isham & Kähkönen’s study shows that the average reported time saving in the studied water project in Maharashtra was 53.9 
minutes per day and the average reported decrease in cases of diarrhoea was 20 % (Isham & Kähkönen 2002, p. 670). 
4 
  
1.3 Method 
The method applied in this thesis is comparative institutional analysis (CIA) regarding two rural water 
management regimes, based on a qualitative field study in the state of Maharashtra, India.  
 
1.3.1 CIA basics 
The major level of study in CIA is institutions. Aoiki (2005, p. 7) define an institution as “self-sustaining, 
salient pattern of social interaction, as represented by meaningful rules that every agent knows and 
incorporates as agents´ shared beliefs about the ways how the game is to be played”. Development 
possibilities of the economy are determined by institutions that build an economic order by co-ordinating 
actors´ behaviour (Solari 2007, p. 23) or putting constrains on actors’ behaviour (Greif 1998, p. 80). The 
comparison of economies allows scholars using the CIA approach to discover these institutions and their 
importance. 
Assuming rational choice within a set of rules leads to a simple maximation problem under the constraints 
of the rules (Solari 2007, p 5.). A starting point of CIA is that people have limited or bounded rationality 
(ibid., p. 2). Bounded rationality is the limits in the capacity of individual agents to objectively analyze the 
structure of the game (Aoki 2005, p. 6). In this game multiple equilibrium are likely to exist in a given 
strategic situation (Greif 1998, p 81).  
 
1.3.2 CIA applied 
Within the CIA framework it is also possible to compare different institutional arrangements in a single 
society at different points in time (Solari 2007, p. 4). Different factors can trigger a crisis of an existing 
institution, and the agents can transit to a new institution (Aoki 2005, p. 3).  This transition is:  
“a process in which they revise their individual expectations about how the game is played and 
eventually reach a modicum of common expectations with the help of ideological and 
entrepreneurial factors as well as past legacies” (ibid., p. 3).  
 
In this process social, political, economic and organizational factors interact (ibid., p. 3). This also becomes a 
competition between searches for new types of playing on the one hand and efforts to preserve the 
existing pattern of playing on the other (ibid., p. 23). Institutions of shared behavioural beliefs need to be 
reconstructed (ibid.).  If limited rationality is assumed “an institutional change involves a change of context 
for action, but also a change in attitudes” (Solari 2007, p. 5). All this imply that an institution cannot be 
changed just by the government laying down a new law, people have to believe in the changed policy and 
change their behaviour to make it an institutional change (Aoki 2005, p. 9).  
An organization can alter the set of the relevant rules of the game by constituting a new player, this can for 
example be the introduction of the bank that provides credit opportunities for new investments that was 
not possible before (Greif 1998, p 81). In this paper the studied NGO constitute the new player that 
introduce the shock to the institutional setting.  The compared systems in this paper are the centralized 
water management regime and the HCC introduced local management regime. The functioning of water 
management in the villages before HCC started their work is in the analysis considered a stable equilibrium 
5 
  
outcome due to the existing institutional setting. First the basics of this system were identified
11
. HCC 
activities have then been analyzed as an externally introduced shock to that system, which then arrives at a 
new outcome. In this study I analyze if this new outcome is stable over time and what variables have been 
affected by the NGO. 
Any comparison involves the setting up of criteria for comparing. One need to reduce complexity of 
economic interaction and therefore a framework to achieve a structuring of phenomena is needed (Solari 
2007, p. 8). Scholars in each sub-discipline within CIA consider some things exogenous to their modelling 
(ibid., p. 23).  The criteria I use are directly taken from Common Pool Resource (CPR ) theory presented in 
the theory chapter of this paper.   
The village is considered the analytic entity and the gathered empirical information is therefore put 
together in syntheses of the condition in each village. These syntheses are then systematically compared in-
between villages (see appendix 2 and 3). The purpose of the systematic analysis is to identify significant 
differences between project and non-project villages (an induced change in the economic system), and 
what differences there are between project villages (mixed results of the NGO:s approach).    
A presentation on the practical method applied to collect the data is presented in chapter four. 
 
1. 4 Outline  
The outline of this thesis is as follows, and illustrated in figure 1.1. Chapter two will present the theoretical 
framework; economic arguments for public provision of goods, and decentralization of the provision lay the 
foundation for introducing common-pool resource theory (CPR) in general and a specific economic 
framework for the water sector. Since the models 
applied are not within the mainstream of economics I 
have chosen to have a rather long theoretical 
presentation. In chapter three the method is presented 
in more detail. 
In chapter four to six I present the empirical material. In 
chapter four the Indian context is introduced, focusing 
on some selected topics. In chapter five I present the 
findings of the project cycle of the water project. In 
chapter six I give the findings of village characteristics 
indicated important by CPR theory. 
In chapter seven the empirical material is discussed in 
relation to the research question and the theoretical 
framework. In chapter nine I summarize the conclusions.  
                                                            
11
 A social system is defined as a set of linked institutions, which are called institutional arrangements. 
Figure 1.1 Outline of the thesis 
6 
  
2. A theoretical perspective   
Economic theory recognizes that free markets do not always achieve the most efficient outcomes, 
externalities can be present. One of the solutions to increase efficiency is, according to traditional 
economics, that the state intervenes as the provider of the good. This is the case in India where the state 
provides subsidized water for household consumption.  
Decentralization, in the development discourse framed in the concept of user participation, is argued to 
increase results and efficiency of public goods provision. Common pool resource (CPR) theory is a suitable 
framework for analyses of can under what circumstances community management of a resource becomes 
sustainable.  
 
2.1 Externalities and different types of goods  
The good of interest in this study is suitable
12
 drinking water. For the scattered rural households covered by 
this study the possible suitable drinking water is water extracted from the ground water. To extract ground 
water a man-made structure is needed: a bore well with pump. The bore well with pump will in the rest of 
this study be called the resource system (in line with Ostrom (1990, p. 30))
13
. 
The quantity of each good produced and the price at which it is sold is in market economies determined by 
the forces of supply and demand (Mankiw 2004, p. 63). In a perfectly competitive market the market forces 
will achieve the most efficient
14
 allocation of resources (ibid., p. 146). But sometimes one actor’s activity 
influences the well being of a bystander, this is called an externality (ibid., pp. 204-207). When externalities 
are present the free market will not produce the most efficient outcome (the actor taking the decision does 
not account for the effect on others). Externalities can be both positive and negative. A positive (negative) 
externality is when some activity yields benefits (harm) to a third party. The market failure can then be 
corrected by the government by inducing the actors to internalize the externality by e.g. subsidizes (taxes).  
Another way to characterize goods in traditional economics is in four typologies; private goods, natural 
monopolies, public goods and common resources (Mankiw 2004, pp. 224-226). The grouping of goods in 
these categories is done according to two characteristics; if the good is excludable (people can be 
prevented from using it) and if it is rival (one person´s use diminishes another person’s ability to use it). 
Figure 2.1 presents the typological classification of goods.  
  Rival 
  Yes No 
Excludable 
Yes Private Goods Natural Monopolies 
No Common Resources Public Goods 
 
Figure 2.1 Four types of Goods  
Source: Mankiw (2004, p. 224) 
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 By suitable I mean drinking water of enough quality to limit the spread of water borne diseases.  
13
 The resource system can be viewed as the entire groundwater basin, but for this study I choose to restrict the view of the 
resource system to the well and the ground water source in reach of the pump. 
14
 Efficiency is when total consumer and producer surplus is maximized. See Mankiw (2004, p. 148) for a further introduction. 
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An intervention in the market can increase efficiency if the good belongs to any other classification than the 
private good. The good studied here is not easily classified; it has characteristics of the natural monopoly, 
the common resource, and the public good.   
It has a high fixed cost for installation of the service and a very small marginal cost of additional users 
(economies of scale) and could thus be viewed as a natural monopoly (which is Mankiw’s suggestion 
regarding drinking water). This implies that for efficiency reasons a government intervention can hinder 
that the price is set too high by a monopolist.  
But as stated above the good has also externalities: good water provision to households is important for 
the society at large (as argued in the introduction) and therefore one could argue that it should be 
subsidized. The state can therefore decide to provide it as a public good that no one is excluded from. 
The resource of ground water is not abundant if the whole system is considered. If the well is scarce of 
water but is not excludable it is a common resource, a common resource has the characteristic of being 
rival. Under such conditions there may be a need for restricting the use.  
These characters of the good have made governments around the world provide water services.  The two 
providers
15
 in this study, the Indian government and HCC, have also come to the conclusion that water for 
household consumption has such characteristics that justify subsidized provision of the good
16
.  The 
economy as a whole benefit of increased consumption of the good. But how does public provision become 
most efficient, let’s turn to that issue now.  
 
2.2 Decentralization and the concept of user participation 
Private owners are thought to have the best incentives to minimize costs of production in contrast to 
bureaucrats in the state apparatus that may become a special-interest group and block cost-reducing 
reforms (Mankiw 2004, p.331). Decentralization is however suggested to increase appropriate incentives 
when a good is publicly provided (Todaro & Smith 2003, p. 714-715). Especially when the services are 
supplied publicly for efficiency reasons and are only utilized by local residents, there is little reason for not 
letting the local government make decisions on these issues.  Local governments are closer to the problems 
that need to be solved and they have therefore better possibilities to make supply meet local preferences 
(Boadway 2003, pp. 4-5). They are believed to have an advantage in information and are more responsible 
to the voters (ibid.).  A major motivation of the central government (when decentralization is introduced) 
has also often been to share fiscal burdens with regions.  
In development economics the concept  ”user participation” is also introduced, it means different 
measures to make development programs more responsive to the demands and needs of the users, thus in 
line with decentralization.  Provision of public goods can become more effective if the public participate in 
                                                            
15
 I follow Ostrom’s distinctions of “providers” as those who arrange the provision and “producers” as those who actually construct, 
repair etc (Ostrom 1990, p. 31). Often both the provider and the producer are found in the same actor but the provider can also 
restrict its action to financing and design.   
16
 The reasons include those given in the introduction regarding implication for increased health etc. 
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the process of decision making, construction, operation and maintenance
17
 (Montgomery 1983, p. 90). 
Participation means some sort of inclusion of the user/local community in management
18
 but does not 
necessarily demand a federal political system.  
Montgomery (1983, pp. 97-98) put up what he calls a “sensitivity hypothesis” to explain what programs for 
delivery of public goods that benefits most from user participation. These programs are those where “local 
effects are variable”, “have to be made frequently but not routinely”, “require quick response from the 
public” and those whose “impact calls for major changes in the behaviour of the public”. All criteria apply to 
water programs.  
There are over 400 participation tools
19
 and research has shown that there cannot be said to be one right 
participatory method to use (Mikkelsen 2005, p. 69). Different types of projects and different contexts have 
different demands. For analytical reasons one can deconstruct participation in more detail: Stakeholders 
can be identified, the project cycle can be identified (project design, implementation, operation and 
maintenance) and the extent of stakeholders’ participation in each stage can be clarified (ibid.).  
 
2.3 Common-pool resource theory 
The experiences of how well the decentralized community management works differ widely. Researchers 
advocating participatory strategies have early indicated that attention needs to be given to context.  
Finsterbusch & Wicklin (1989, p. 591) states that “the impact of participation differs significantly by type of 
project and societal context”.   
Empirical research on how local institutions are coping with common management of resources has have 
lead to the creation of common pool resource (CPR) theory. CPR theorists put up criteria regarding under 
what circumstances small communities of resource users can create management regimes that help them 
allocate benefits equitably, over long time periods, and with only limited efficiency losses (Agrawal 2001, 
pp. 1649-1650). 
CPR theory focuses on small-scale resources. Ostrom (1990, p.261) define small-scale as ranging from 50 to 
15 000 users.  According to Ostrom (ibid., p. 30) CPR is defined as “a natural or man-made resource system 
that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from 
obtaining benefits from its use”.  Wade (1988, p. 183) sees common resources as a sub-set of public goods, 
those public resources that are “subject to congestion, depletion or degradation”.  
But Wade also includes resources where the problem is not so much congestion as the externalities (Wade 
1988, p. 184). According to Wade empirical findings also shows the existence of voluntary contributions to 
public goods, beyond natural resource management (Wade 1988, p. 199).  And Ostrom conclude:  
                                                            
17
 There are also some objections towards user participation (Todaro & Smith 2003, p. 716): First, mechanisms for genuine 
participation are in most cases not in place and establishing them takes time when action is needed immediately. Second, “if you 
are too unhealthy and unskilled to participate in the world economy, you are probably not able to effectively participate in 
development projects either”. Third, time is money and the poor are busy trying to survive.  
18
 In the literature you can also find the other terms used synonymously; e.g. local participation, community participation, 
beneficiary participation, and participation of stakeholders.  
19
 A participation tool is the instruction on how to carry out a specific session in the development program, for example it can be 
guiding the village in a session during which villagers graphically construct a map of the resources available for them.   
9 
  
“Given the similarity between many CPR problems and the problems of providing small-scale 
collective goods, the findings from this volume should contribute to an understanding of the factors 
that can enhance or detract from the capabilities of individuals to organize collective action related 
to providing local public goods.”  
 (Ostrom 1990, p. 27) 
“These [problems] have to do with coping with free-riding
20
, solving commitment problems, 
arranging the supply of new institutions, and monitoring individual compliance with sets of rule.” 
(Ostrom 1990, p. 27) 
 
I therefore feel comfortable applying this theory to the problem of this thesis without being able to clarify 
to what degree drinking water is rival. I also choose this theoretical framework over alternative theories 
that deal with local provision of public goods such as “club theory” (see Scotchmer 2002) or theories of 
“optimal federalism” (see Rosen 2004) since I believe CPR theory to be more suitable for the developing 
countries where more market imperfections exists.   
 
2.3.1 The prisoners’ dilemma 
At hart at analyses of collective actions lies the prisoners’ dilemma. The starting point of CPR theory is 
perhaps best viewed as a criticism of a too simple analysis of this dilemma.   
To explain the prisoners’ dilemma let us picture a situation where there are rules restricting overuse of a 
resource for sustainability reasons. The prisoners’ dilemma applied as explained by Wade (1998, pp. 200-
204) works as follows:  
 “Each individual has a clear preference order of options:  
(i) everyone else abides by the rule while the individual enjoys unrestricted access (he free rides); 
(ii) everyone, including himself, follows the rule;  
(iii) no one follows the rule; 
(iv) he follows the rule while no one else does” (Wade 1998, 201).  
The third outcome becomes the “stable group outcome” with these preferences. Cheating, the first 
alternative, is the incentive for each individual which makes the whole community to arrive at the third 
alternative. The cheating at least avoids the worst alternative that is being the only one that follows the 
rule.  
There are two theoretical options to avoid overuse: Turn the resource over to private owners, who then 
have the incentive not to overuse, or put coercion from outside by the government. Rational people cannot 
achieve rational outcome alone because what is rational for an individual in this game is irrational for the 
collective as a hole.   
                                                            
20
 Free-rider problems is whenever people cannot be excluded from the benefits others provide (Ostrom 1990, p. 6). 
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But the game is only played this way if one imposes some restrictions. The players must be ignorant of 
what the others choose and s/he is restricted to choose only once.  The first assumption makes it 
impossible to negotiate to change the rules of the game. But the basics of CPR theory is that if the players 
know that the game will be played repeatedly there is a chance that they will cooperate today in hope of 
that others will then follow. If people can negotiate they can introduce penalties for violating agreements 
etc.  Without these two restrictions the more rational strategy is thus to cooperate first and defect if other 
defects. In a more complex situation considerations of morality, power, and loyalty also restrain free-riding.  
Advocators of CPR theory have found empirical evidence for cases where local communities do overcome 
the prisoners’ dilemma and build community responses to achieve more efficient outcomes. According to 
Wade (1988, ch. 11) the situation regarding village resource use resembles more the situation that make 
rational choice-makers cooperate than it resembles the situation of the “prisoners’ dilemma”.  In a 
localized small scale physical setting where individuals repeatedly communicate and interact with one and 
other Ostrom says: 
“It is possible that they can learn whom to trust, what effects their actions will have on each other 
and on the CPR, and how to organize themselves to gain benefits and avoid harm.” 
 (Ostrom 1990, p. 184) 
 
According to Ostrom: 
“The commitment is to follow the rules so long as (1) most similarly situated individuals adopt the 
same commitment and (2) the long-term expected net benefits to be achieved by this strategy are 
greater than the long-term expected net benefits for individuals following the short-term, dominant 
strategies.” 
 (Ostrom 1990, p. 186) 
 
How individuals weight their own assessments of benefits and costs will depend on the norms that they 
internalize and the discount rate
21
  that they utilize (ibid., p. 206). Coleman, cited in Ostrom (ibid.), 
distinguishes between norms that are internalized (guilt, anxiety, lowered conceptions or self-worth), and 
shared norms where sanctioning for nonconformity comes from others who are part of the same group and 
exhibits social displeasure if a norm is broken (ibid.). Ostrom argues that monitoring and graduated 
sanctions are necessary so enough people will follow the rules and extensive rule-breaking is not triggered 
(ibid., p. 187).  
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  Benefits expected to be received in the future is thought of less value than benefits today (Ostrom 1990, p.34).  
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2.3.2 Enabling factors for sustainability 
“What remains unexplained is how some appropriators overcome, and others do not overcome, the 
problems associated with collective provision of delicately calibrated institutions that create 
institutions in which individuals find it advantageous, credible, and safe to pursue contingent 
commitments to rule compliance and mutual monitoring.”  
(Ostrom 1990, p. 187) 
 
There are two parts of CPR theory: Conditions relating to why these situations appear and conditions for 
sustainability (Wade 1988, p. 188). The second set is the focus for this study.  There is yet to be formed a 
coherent theory for CPR. Empirical research up to date can only suggest a list of prerequisites, mainly 
institutional variables, which enable sustainable CPR management.  A synthesises of the present stance of 
CPR theory is found in an article by Arun Agrawal (2001). It is a summary of three book-length empirically 
based studies in this genre, namely Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990), and Baland & Platteau (1996). He also 
compares the findings of the three scholars to more literature. In his critique of CPR theory Harris (2003, p. 
2) agrees on these three publications to be the “main point of reference in the field”
22
.   
Agrawal’s research summery within the CPR paradigm is presented in appendix 1. He presents four areas 
that one needs to consider and the relationships in between them, see figure 2.2. 
 
                                                            
22
 According to Harris (2003) many scholars are still critical to the state agencies or NGO:s’ abilities to craft institutions such as 
water users associations.  The many scholarly objections seem to come mainly from anthropologists and are “the typical of 
anthropologists’ criticism of the economistic, instrumental rationality” as Harris puts it. He suggests that focus should be on the 
analysis of power relations.  
 
A&C 
A&B 
Figure 2.2 Analytical spheres of CPR theory  
Source: author’s graphical presentation (based on Agrawal 2001) 
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 First, one needs to consider the resource system, which means things like the size of the resource and its 
predictability. Second, the group characteristic, which means things like clarity of group boundaries, level of 
social capital and types of leadership in the group. Third, institutional arrangements, which means things 
like rules and how they are monitored and sanctioned.  Fourth, the external environment, which means the 
local communities relations with the state and with the external markets. Important are also some matches 
between the resource system and the group characteristics (for example the group dependence of the 
resource) and the matches between resource system and institutions (for example restrictions on harvest 
of the resource needs to match the resource capacity).  
 I will exemplify this applied research by shortly presenting one aspect: moral norms of the group. This is 
included in category “group characteristics”. Balland & Platteau (1996, p. 125) explain the importance of 
norms by that:  
“when norms are well established and effectively sustained through appropriate secondary 
socialization process, people tend (a) to adopt to the other’s viewpoint when making decisions that 
may harm others´ interests and to feel internally rewarded when behaving in other-regarding ways; 
(b) to be confident that others will abide by the same code of good behaviour as themselves; (c) to 
cling to this code even when they had unpleasant experiences in which they were suckers; (d) to feel 
quality after they have (perhaps mistakenly) deviated from the moral rule: and (e) feel vengeful and 
willing to punish detectable free-riders (and perhaps also people who refuse to do so and continue 
to entertain good relations with the free riders).” 
(Balland & Platteau 1996, p. 125)  
 
Balland & Platteau also writes that “monitoring problem does not even arise if moral rules are backed by 
religious beliefs according to which gods knows everything about all our actions” (ibid., p. 126). When 
people see a better next or future life they are not easily discouraged by bad experience.  
To summarize, CPR theory gives a framework for analyzing each specific situation of local management of a 
common resource. At interest is under what circumstances people overcome the prisoners’ dilemma and 
free riding is deterred. I will now try to narrow this framework even more by only considering the rural 
water sector.  
13 
  
 
2.4 Economic framework for projects in the rural water sector 
In this section I will specify the analytical framework applied in this thesis. Three larger, rather resent, 
studies on water management in the Indian rural water sector form the starting point, together with the 
theoretical discussion presented above. 
Manikutty (1998) conducts a comparative study of five water and sanitation projects in India. All these 
projects have incorporated community participation at some stage. The study was based on a purposive 
sample of villages in order to find common determinants for project turnouts. In each village care takers, 
village leaders and community members were interviewed, both by questionnaire and open-ended 
questions. Also project officials and project documents were consulted. Manikutty concludes that 
participation differed along two basic dimensions; the intensity of participation and the sustainability of 
participation. He argue that participation must be planned and managed and suggests several design 
parameters. 
Kolsky et.al. (2000) evaluate UNICEF´s water and environmental sanitation program in India from 1966 to 
1998 by five complementary methodologies: key informant interviews, field visits, participatory user 
assessment, mail survey of UNICEF partners, and desk reviews of more than 400 UNICEF and non-UNICEF 
documents. Amongst other things they say that the balance between achievements in quality and coverage 
is a delicate issue. They also argue in support of community-based management of water supply.  
Isham & Känhönen (2002) study the impact and performance of community-based water services by using 
qualitative and quantitative data from 1 088 rural households and 50 water committees. Their econometric 
analysis especially shows that social capital has an important impact on community-based water services, 
but they also argue for some institutional variables found important.  
Based on this sector specific economic research one can identify a list of variables being most important for 
sustainable drinking water management. The list is presented in appendix 1. The study by Isham & 
Kähkönen (2002) is the one with most clarity on the theoretical framework used. I therefore use their 
model for this sector as the foundation for my framework. Their framework draws both from a wider 
selection of research on user participation in development projects and from CPR theory. Figure 2.1 
illustrates their model for causal relationships of factors within a drinking water program. 
14 
  
 
Figure 2.3 Determinants of impact and performance  
Source: Based on a figure by Isham & Kähkönen (2002, p. 672) 
 
The impact on improved health and time saving depends on the performance of the water service (link 1). 
The performance, measured as users satisfaction with the service and quality of the construction identified 
technically, is determined by service rules and practices (link 2). The most important such practice is that 
users should be participating in the design and construction phase. The functioning of these service rules 
and practices are depending on underlying factors of social capital (link 3), and government and NGO rules 
and practices (link 4). 
In this paper I discuss sustainability of the project with the objective to find what government and NGO 
practices are effective in achieving sustainability in community management regimes. Thus the model can 
be rearranged and extended for this specific purpose.  The interesting depended variable is sustainable 
management, i.e. performance of water service over time, not health effect. The hypothesis of this paper is 
that there exists a relationship of variables affecting sustainable management (S) looking like this:  
S = f (QD, QC, QO) + µ 
where the variables included are: 
QD = Quality of project design 
QC = Quality of construction 
QO = Quality of operation and maintenance. 
 
The three variabeles of a project are taken from Finsterbusch & Wicklin (1989). 
 
In my framework QD, QC and QO are endogenous variables assumed to be explained by similar functions; I 
therefore choose to only specify one function, the function for QO. QO is a function of how the villagers 
1 
2 
3 4 
A 
B 
C 
D E 
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participate in operation and maintenance (PO) and the actions taken by the external agency (A0). In other 
words, quality is improved either by the villagers doing something by themselves to improve quality or the 
government or some other external agency putting in resources to improve quality.     
 
QO = f(Po, Ao) + µ 
 
where Ao is an exogenous variable and Po is an endogenous variable given by 
 
 
Po = f (G1, G2 , …, Gn, Io) + µ 
 
where all G:s are exogenous variables for group characteristics (level of social capital, group size etc.), while 
Io  is an index variable weighting the institutional settings affecting operation and maintenance (e.g. utility 
rules and its enforcement). This is based on Agrawal (2001). 
 
Thus, to achieve sustainability in a water program this hypothesis suggests that a suitable level of 
participation for each stage in the project cycle, and/or direct action from an external agency, is needed. 
Some group characteristics are believed to be multiplying factors affecting all stages of the project cycle (as 
social capital in the model of Isham & Kähkönen presented above). Regarding institutional arrangements, 
these are believed to be different variables affecting participation at different parts of the project cycle. 
The external agents can directly affect project design, construction, and operation and maintenance. 
 
Resource system variables, identified within CPR theory, are not included since these are assumed to be 
fixed when only one type of resource system is studied.  
 
The hypothesis presented here is more straight forward than those suggested by Agrawal (2001, pp. 1663 – 
1664). He suggests causality between many more of the variables, but I believe it to be a good enough 
approximate starting point for my discussion without contradicting Agrawal. 
 
The program implementing agency can use very different approaches. To give an example, the agency can 
use its resources to directly handle some parts of the project cycle, as doing all the maintenance without 
any participation of the users (affecting Eo) or it can invest resources in capacity building by affecting the 
group characteristics to enhance the result of village participation. I will use this model for the comparative 
institutional analysis, studying how village institutions are changed by the NGO:s actions and what the 
results become. 
 
16 
  
3. Extended presentation of method 
As presented in section 1.3 the method applied in this paper is a comparative institutional analysis. In this 
chapter the practical methods used to gather the empirical material is presented. 
 
3.1  Literature study  
What you have read so far is based on a literature study on participatory water management. In the rest of 
the thesis I continue to use various literatures to illuminate the discussion on the empirical material. I also 
use written information from HCC and MCCS, such as the book “Mission i religionernas land”
23
 published by 
MCCS and project plans these organizations present to Sida for economic support. One has to be aware of 
that this is not an objective source but for the purpose of outlining the basic background I do not think the 
possibility of positive bias in the material should be seen as a problem. I just regard the information as the 
view of HCC and MCCS.  
 
3.2 The field study 
The major part of the study is carried out as a field study in the state of Maharashtra in India during eight 
weeks (mid-September to mid-November 2007).    
First the choice of qualitative or quantitative study is made on the basis of research question. Econometric 
evidence of a positive correlation between participation and better project results has already been 
established (Isham & Kähkönen 2002). I aim to understand the process better, and thus the qualitative path 
is chosen. When choosing method within qualitative methodology I considered some factors, of which the 
time limitation (one researcher during 8 weeks in an unknown setting), the language barrier (a translator is 
needed to speak with the majority of affected people), and the gender aspect (me being a man and half of 
the affected people being women) are the three most important.  
A balance between looking at different performances in different areas and in different villages and still 
getting deep enough information in each case is needed. A two face approach is therefore chosen. In the 
first part an overview study of three program areas is carried out. In the second part of the study one 
program area is chosen for a village level study.  
 
3.2.1 Introduction to the area 
An introduction to the work of HCC is given by their project treasurer, Mr. Philip Navdi. Then a three day 
introduction program in the field with the guidance of the HCC development officer in 
Phandharpur/Sangola , Mr Viveck Bhaskav, follow. This can be seen as an extended “grand tour question” 
with a relatively limited amount of semi-structured interviews (Willis 2006, pp. 144-145). On the basis of 
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 Title translated to English reads “Mission in the land of religions”. 
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this introduction program I identify eleven types of stakeholders
24
, see table 3.1. Due to time constrains I 
exclude three of these from the study, the other ones I determine to be more important. 
 
Table 3.1  Stakeholders in drinking water management 
 Included in the study Not included in the study 
Area level - HCC development officer  
- HCC staff 
- Staff at block development office 
- NGO previously or now working in 
the area  
- District level government  
Village level - Village level government 
- Female users  
- Male users 
- Care taker of the hand pump 
- Community health volunteer 
- Former land owner of the land 
used for the bore well 
 
Source: author’s construction 
 
3.2.2 Study at taluka level 
Three Talukas (administrative area) are chosen for the overview study; Pandharpur/Sangola, Rampurvardi 
and Indapur 
25
. The choice made mainly due to logistical reasons, i.e. available travel arrangement and 
availability of present program staff. In each taluka semi-structured interviews are carried out with staff 
from the NGO along with a field visit in the area. These interviews are mostly carried out directly in English, 
but in some cases one staff-member interpreted the answers from a fellow staff-member. This material, 
together with the theory and previous research, forms the foundation for a village level study.   
 
3.2.3 Study at village level 
The Phandarpur/Sangola block is chosen for the detailed village level study because of the heavy focus on 
the drinking water issue in the area and because of the stage of project activities; the drinking water 
constructions had been in place for some time (1-2 years) but HCC is still working in the villages and thus 
have easy access to the villages. Eight program villages are included in the study. These are chosen with 
purposive sampling: villages of different size and variation in environmental conditions are chosen with the 
help of HCC’s development officer in the area. In addition two reference villages where HCC has not been 
working is also studied. The reference villages are chosen randomly within the same area.  
In every program village two to three semi-structured focus group interviews
26
 are conducted. Except 
ordinary users I try to include  members of the Gram Panchayat (the village level governing body) and the 
trained care taker of the hand pump (see table 3.2). Community Health Volunteers (CHV) are covered 
through attending a separate CHV-meeting where a focus group interview with them is conducted. Two 
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 According to the definition of Mikkelsen (2005, p. 349) stakeholders are “all those who have interest in an intervention or are 
likely to be affected by it” 
25
 A taluka is an administrative area established by the government. However, the field office of HCC in Pandharpur covers both the 
taluka of Pandharpur and the neighbouring Sangola taluka, and thus I refer to Pandharpur/Sangola as a single taluka in this paper. 
Talkukas are also referred to as blocks.  
26
 A focus group is a research technique where data is collected through group interaction concerning a topic decided by the 
researcher (Wibeck 2000, p. 23).    
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approaches to form the focus groups are used. Either I am invited for tea by the Sarpanch (the president of 
the Gram Panchayat) in the centre of the village and a focus group is created with men present at that 
time, or we drive to an HCC-installed hand pump, often in a village hamlet, and create a focus group with 
the people present in the vicinity. With this second approach it normally take about five minutes to create a 
group spontaneously while the alternative approach often is arranged in advance by the HCC-staff. The 
focus groups around the hand pumps normally consists of three to six people and the village centre 
meetings could become somewhat larger, although normally only about three people in each group take 
initiative to speak. Every session lasts for approximately 30 minutes up to an hour.  
 
Table 3.2 Conducted focus group interviews in Pandharpur/Sangola 
Village Number of focus groups 
interviews with users 
Sarpanch present in any 
of the interviews 
Maintenance person 
present in any of the 
interviews 
Bohuli 3 Yes Yes 
Diksal 1 - - 
Huatakae Mangewalli  
(reference village) 
1 Yes - 
Itaki   
(reference village) 
1 Yes - 
Khardi 
(women’s group) 
1 - Yes 
Mathwest 
(women’s group) 
1 - Yes 
Mesingi 2 Yes - 
Narraj 3 Yes Yes 
Umborgum 3 - Yes 
Village V
27
 2 Yes - 
Village W
28
 
(women’s group) 
1 - - 
Waki 3 Yes - 
Wuni Chinchale 2 - - 
Source: author’s construction 
 
This way of selecting informants creates biases in two ways: Only people living close to the bore wells are 
included in the focus groups, and the majority of people participating in the focus groups are using a 
project bore well, even though the majority of bore wells in the villages are government installed. 
Awareness of this underlay the analysis. 
Mainly men are present, but in some groups also women take part. This bias was created due to the fact 
that we often are five men (me, two men from HCC, and two male interpreters who arrive to conduct the 
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 Because my field notes unfortunately are incomplete regarding the names of all visited villages two villages are named “Village 
V” and “Village W” in the thesis.  
28
 See previous note. 
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interviews). Thus, a limited complementing study is carried out conducting three focus group interviews 
with women’s saving groups in three villages, accompanied by female staff-members from HCC.  
In the reference villages only one focus group is carried out with a larger group of men gathered in the 
Gram Panchayat office. This makes it difficult to analyze the gender aspect in these villages, this has to be 
dealt with only through the expressed attitudes of men. 
The reasons for choosing focus groups is to address two out of the three major factors (mentioned in the 
introduction of 3.2) obstructing the possibilities of carrying out this study: With focus groups it is possible to 
gather more material within the given timeframe. I also believe it is easier to meet a group of women for an 
interview instead of individual single woman. The third major limitation is the language barrier and the 
need to use an interpreter hints that focus groups should not be used. Simultaneous interpretation of a 
free discussion with several informants is complicated. But with structured focus groups with relatively 
narrow questions I find it possible to moderate a group interview with an interpreter. But this approach has 
the drawback of the translation often being a summary made after the group discussion had led to some 
conclusion on each question. 
Most of the interviews are interpreted by different college lectures from Sangola College (not related to 
HCC) but in some cases some HCC-staff interpret
29
.  
 
3.3. Analyzing the data 
The interviews are recorded and the recordings are partly transcribed. Out of the transcriptions synthesises 
of the conditions in every village on different topics is constructed (see appendix 2 and 3) and a 
comparative institutional analysis based on the framework presented in the theory chapter is used to 
analyze the material.  
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 The quoted statements of people in the thesis are reconstructions based on the interpretations to English, i.e. when the 
interpreter says “she says she is not much educated” the quotation read “I am not much educated”.   
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4. Background for the empirical study 
This background chapter includes an introduction to the federal system of India, the social context and 
water management in India. The studied NGO is also introduced with focus on its development work.  
 
4.1 Indian federalism and the Indian village  
When discussing decentralization and common pool resource management some background of the Indian 
federal political system is needed, thus follows this presentation. 
India, a union of states, is a democratic republic with a parliamentary system of government. Its federal 
system is extensive with many levels. There are 28 states and 7 Union territories in the country
30
, see figure 
4.1. The decision-making body of the union is an elected parliament. The President is the constitutional 
head of Executive of the Union. In the states, the Governor, as the representative of the President, is the 
head of Executive. The system of government in states closely resembles that of the Union with a state 
parliament (Government of India 2007a). In the rest of this paper I make no difference between state or 
union program so when I use the term Government I mean state or union government. When I refer to the 
local governing bodies I use the concepts developed below.  
 
               
Figure 4.1 States and Union territories of India                     Figure 4.2 Taluks in Maharashtra  
Arrow pointing to Maharashtra               Arrow pointing at Solapur  
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 Union Territories are administered by the president through an administrator appointed by him. 
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Within the states there are a three-tier “federal system” called Panchayati Raj (Tripathy 2006, p. 70). The 
area which this study focuses lies within Maharashtra state. This state with close to 97 million people 
according to the 2001 census, is divided into 35 districts, see figure 4.2. The focus area lies within Solapur 
district with approximately 3.8 million people (Government of India 2007b). 
The Solapur district, see figure 4.3, comprises of eleven administrative areas called talukas or blocks. Two of 
these are the focus of this study: Pandharpur and Sangola. Pandharpur has a population of 402 707 people 
in 95 villages and Sangola a population of 272 077 people in 103 villages according to the 2001 census 
(Government of India 2007b). 
 
Figure 4.3 Map of Solapur district, arrows pointing at Panharpur and Sangola 
 
At each administrative level there is an elected governing body: at district level called Zilla Parishad, at 
taluka level called Panchayat Samiti, and at village level called Gram Panchayat (Government of 
Maharashtra 2007a). At each level there are also civil servants working for the government.   
The concept of the Indian village has two meanings. One is the juridical meaning, which includes everyone 
living in a certain area independently of living in a housing establishment out in the fields or in the village 
centre. All these people are eligible to vote in the election to the Gram Panchayat and the Gram Panchayat 
is responsible for facilitating resources from government schemes to all villagers (Keskar 2007). The Gram 
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Panchayat also has the power to hear complaints from villagers and administer punishment (Sharma 2006, 
p. 1).  
The other notion is the one of the larger gathering of houses that makes up what appears to the observer 
as the village (observation). When I use the term village in this paper I mean the juridical term, thus all 
people who will receive the government service through the Gram Panchayat. I use the term “main village” 
when talking about the other understanding of the village. 
There are two more terms I also use to describe the housing pattern. When a group of houses are gathered 
together outside the main village it is called a hamlet (Bhaskav 2007). A hamlet is a geographical and not 
political term. The rest of the people live scattered on the fields (observation). So within a village governed 
by one Gram Panchayat people can live in the main village, in a hamlet or scattered in individual housings 
on the field. 
At the village level there is also a forum called Gram Sabha. It is a village meeting that every villager can 
attend. Tripathy (2006, p. 72) writes that this function puts elected representatives accountable to the 
common people directly and regularly. When working properly the forum is entrusted with micro planning, 
social audit of Gram Panchayat, ratification of Panchayat accounts, identification and approval of 
beneficiaries and supervisory functions that lowers corruption (Tripathy 2007, p. 71; Mittal 2006, pp. 27-
28). 
This political structure exists in a social context described next. 
 
4.2 The social context 
Both the CIA approach and CPR theory imply an analysis of the context. But of course the whole social 
system is complex and I therefore choose to present only the three areas I believe to be the most 
important: religion, caste and gender. The selected focus is based on a literature study of social science 
writing on India. I believe these to have an important impact on group characteristics (variables Gn) and the 
institutional setting (variables In) introduced in section 2.4.  
 
4.2.1 Religion 
Todaro and Smith (2003, p.42) put forward that “[...] religion often play a major role in the success or 
failure of development efforts”.  For example a correlation can be found between the diversity of the 
population and political instability in the country. This means religious diversity could lead to political 
instability that hinders economic development. 
Harris-White (2002) has presented an article on the implications for the economy of the religious pluralism 
in India. In the article she sees religion as “the institutional arrangements and modes of living to which 
sacred status have been given by a complex of beliefs and values” and she writes that Hinduism has been 
very influential in shaping social and legal institutions (ibid. p. 3). Hinduism is the dominating religion in 
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India (and the studied area), only 17 percent belong to minority religions
31
 (ibid., p. 3). The largest minority 
religion Islam is also influential.  
The previous academic discussion on this topic is by Harris-White presented as a polarization between on 
one hand economist Myrdal’s  ideas of Hinduism as a reason for India’s economic backwardness, and on 
the other hand Singer’s writings on Hinduism as being used for social change (ibid. p. 5). Harris-White 
herself reaches the conclusion that “the effects are mixed and the influence of religion varies greatly 
according to context” (ibid. p. 33). But it is evident that religion has not stepped back into the private 
sphere in India (ibid. p. 6). The state policy of secularism does instead mean equal public respect for all 
religions (ibid. p. 7). Customary and personal law is organized on religious lines, laws that among other 
things affect the way inheritance transfer recourses.  
 
4.2.2 The caste system 
The Indian society is stratified by caste. The caste system is a part of the Hindu religion but at the same 
time a separate phenomenon covering the whole Indian society.  Because of the dominant position of 
Hinduism also other religious communities have been included in the caste structure.  
 The caste system is compiled of two concepts; jati and varna (Narang 2006, pp. 61-63). Jati refers to 
“interdependent, hierarchically ranked, birth-ascribed groups”. Jatis are specific to each region and 
associated with the traditional occupations in that region. It is the categories of grouped jatis that are called 
varna and the four varna are the same all over India. The jati group is what counts in the village setting. Jati 
belonging has traditionally determined once stance against people of other jatis.   
How rigid this structure is has been debated; Kaviraj (1997, p.5) writes that caste has shown ”a remarkable 
ability to withstand impact of economic reorganization” but he and other writers such as Mosse (2003) and 
Srinvas (1976) present data showing that caste over time has been renegotiated due to changes in e.g. 
land-ownership. The importance of caste in everyday interaction of people is changing and people today do 
no longer observe the same restrictions, a high caste person is today able to sit next to a low caste person 
which was not possible before (Srinvas 1976, Bhaskav 2007). Instead caste today has two political and 
economical roles. It is the base for village politics and it is an indicator of economic stratification. 
Factionalism is the reality of typical village politics and village politics, is to a large extent based on caste 
(Sharma 2006, p. 3; Mosse 2003, pp. 132-133). This is because appealing to caste membership is the easiest 
way to raise a voter constituency in the present reality, when most politicians suggest the same agenda. 
When it comes to economic stratification lower caste communities are generally poorer than higher caste 
communities, even tough there are exceptions for individual persons (Sharma 2006, p. 3; Bahskav 2007).  
So, Indians segregate themselves on the basis of religion and caste, but a person’s sex is also an important 
determinant as presented next. 
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 Minority religions are Jainism, Buddhism, Sikhism, religions of tribal people, religions of scheduled castes, Christianity, Islam and 
the Parsi faith (Harris-White 2002. p. 2) 
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4.2.3 Gender 
Sida’s position paper on water resources states that “women and men have different needs and control 
over resources and decision making bodies” (Sida 1999, p. 10). A gender analysis can thus clarify different 
priorities. In several aspects gender differences are essential in the Indian society. 
The life condition of men is generally better than the situation for women. Sen (2005, p. 226) has 
calculated, based on male-female ratio comparison, that 37 million women were missing in India in 1986. 
This is, according to Sen, because of a higher mortality rate among females in all age groups. The main 
reasons for the more severe health situation for women have been repeated pregnancies, child birth, 
malnutrition, overwork and stress and lack of education (Tripathy 2006, p. 131).  
Women and girls work a lot more than men and boys. A study in the Himalayan region found that a pair of 
bullocks work for 1 064 hours per pair, a man for 1 202 hours and a woman for 3 485 hours in a year on a 
one hectare farm (Tripathy 2006, p.130). A large part of the women’s work is outside what is considered to 
be the economic sector: she spends time collecting water, fodder and fuel and she takes care of children 
and cooks food (ibid.).    
The political arena has traditionally been open only to men but since 1988 women are guaranteed one 
third of the seats in decision-making bodies, from the Gram Panchayats to the Parliament (Triparthy 2006, 
p. 11).   
Research has showed that improving the situation of women affect the whole family positively. An 
educated woman is more likely to participate in the family discussions affecting important issues as health 
(Tripathy 2006, p. 133). Thus, including women in community affairs is important but needs special 
attention covering all aspects of women’s deprivation.  Women will participate when they are enough 
supported, and if critical mass of participating women is achieved there is greater hope of that this 
participation also will be sustainable (Kameswari 2006, p. 256).   
Now, with basic knowledge about the Indian economical and political system, the caste system, Indian 
religious reality and gender issues it is time to describe the Indian water situation. 
 
4.3 Water management in India 
Water for household consumption has traditionally been provided by open sources, i.e. dams, open wells 
or directly from rivers (see figure 4.4). It was first in the 1960’s, in response to serious draught situations, 
that investment in rural drinking water systems took off, funded by the Indian state, UNICEF, bilateral 
donors and different NGO:s (Kolsky et.al. 2000, p. 25). At least one larger private company, Unilever, has 
financed similar work (Soares 2007). Their motivation, as a private company, is that a stimulated rural 
economy and increased capacity and knowledge in the rural communities are believed to increase the 
market of soap and detergents (ibid.).  
These investments introduced closed water sources such as bore wells with hand pumps or electrical 
pumps (see figure 4.5). Electrical pumps can also supply water from open sources trough filter tanks and 
pipe line connections. The government provides emergency relief with tanker vehicles (Gasavi et.al. 2007). 
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Ground water is today estimated to be the source of 80-90 percent of drinking water (Kolsky et.al. 2000, p. 
8). The national irrigation laws (Indian Easement Act of 1882) state that ground water belongs to the land 
owner who can freely extract and use it (ibid.) and the state of Maharashtra has not introduced any law 
restricting the amount to be used (Baliram et.al. 2007). Enforcing such rules by bureaucratic institutions is 
also thought to be almost impossible (ibid.).  
  
   
Figure 4.4 Open well   Figure 4.5. Hand pump 
In 1970 a major synchronized system change in the drinking water regime was to take place as a result of a 
national conference at Madurai (Kolsky et.al 2000, p. 39). The conference recommended a three-tier 
system of hand pump maintenance with a village caretaker, a taluka-level mechanic (for a hundred pumps) 
and a mobile repair team at district level (for a thousand hand pumps). The structures would still be owned 
by the central government. The village caretaker was supposed to carry out his duties unpaid; duties 
include preventive maintenance and report of brake down. Most village care takers quickly stopped 
performing this work (ibid.). Actually, in practice the system was quickly replaced by a one-tier system with 
a mobile team carrying out all the maintenance.   
The water situation is still a great problem for India. The per capita availability of water in India in 2001 was 
estimated to be half of the 1947-level (Narain 2006, p. 2). In 2000 one of six inhabitants in rural areas was 
lacking what the government considers to be acceptable water coverage (Kolsky etl.al. 2000, p. 25).  This is 
both because the ground water table today is declining across the country, and the infrastructure for water 
provision is deteriorating while population is growing (ibid.). 
By the shift of the millennium several evaluations of water programs were published and the latest major 
shift in policy took place. Several organizations made new efforts to involve the local community. Kolsky et. 
al. concluded that: 
“Community-based management of water supply can alleviate the massive government 
expenditures in operation and maintenance, but much sound pilot work and evaluations remains 
before this goal can be achieved.” 
 (Kolsky et.al. 2000, p. 2)       
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The Indian government also recognized that sustainability was a problem with its program and that 
infrastructure was deteriorating (Narain 2006, p. 12). The government now turned to allocate 20 percent of 
the rural water supply funds to quality improvement of already installed pumps and, and 15 percent for 
operation and maintenance. In 2002 the program was further altered so that the community would own, 
operate and maintain the water system (ibid.). This means that the communities are required to contribute 
with ten percent of the total capital costs and that Gram Panchayats becomes responsible for operation 
and maintenance of the scheme. The Gram Panchayat charges the villagers and recovers costs for 
maintaining the scheme. This reformed government program has not yet had any large impact in 
Maharashtra and is not covered by this study. 
 
4.4 Hindustani Covenant Church 
The studied NGO, Hindustani Covenant Church (HCC), is a protestant church with congregations gathering 
people for Sunday service. It also has a large sector of social work and development work, i.e. they run 
schools and medical services, their social workers tries to raise aids awareness among tobacco workers in 
Solapur, they teach kids in the slum areas of Mumbai, and work with the issue of child labor in Pune etc. 
(Navdi 2007; observation). In addition their disaster support team is always ready to leave for any place in 
India in just a day or two (Keskar 2007a). Water was the starting point for all this. 
The drilling of new bore wells in Maharashtra by HCC and its predecessor
32
 has been going on since the 
1960’s (Fröberg & Jallen 2004, p. 31). They only drill bore wells for household consumption of water. They 
have always claimed that these deep drilled wells are not suitable for irrigation, at first because the electric 
pumps needed to extract the irrigation water were too expensive (ibid., p. 32) and today because they have 
learnt what ecological constrains there are on the ground water level (Bhaskav 2007). However they 
believe the bore wells are very suitable for hand pumping of drinking water.  
Oskar Carlsson, a Swedish engineer and volunteer of the HCC run Solapur Well Service, developed the India 
Mark II hand pump that became standardized in cooperation with UNICEF (Carlsson 2004).  This pump has 
since been spread around the world through UNICEF (Carlsson 2004; Navdi 2007; Kolsky et.al. 2000, p. 21, 
36). A lot of HCC experience of the practices of people has continuously improved the design of the hand 
pump
33
 (Navdi 2007; Carlsson 2004).  
Fröberg & Jallen (2004, p. 34), early involved in the activities, states that it was good maintenance practices 
that was most difficult to establish. The tendency was that when the wells became dysfunctional the 
people just stopped using them. Over the years the work has steadily gone through a learning process and 
the practice has also evolved.  More focus was to be given to pump service.  
According to Singh (2004, pp. 27-28) HCC today has the goal to be able to meet the full need of society, by 
integrating a variety of activities. The development and social work aims at reaching all people independent 
of caste, class or religion. Singh say that by the programs people are able to overcome unemployment and 
poverty and unfair structures in society. One important goal is also to strengthen the position of women.  
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 The work was started by the Mission Covenant Youth of Sweden (SMU). 
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 For example they learnt that children play with the hand pump by covering the tap with their hands while pumping, this damage 
the pump. They solved this by putting holes in the tap pipe allowing water to exit an alternative way when the pump is put into 
such practice.   
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HCC´s water policy states that it wishes to “promote an understanding which will preserve and support 
initiative that will [make] water accessible to all” (Hindustani Covenant Church 2004, p. 2).  The main 
principles for the projects are; active grass root involvement, strengthen peoples own agency, evoke social 
awareness (awareness of human rights, social rights, equality and the importance of sustainable natural 
resource management), organizing cooperations and a focus on poverty reduction
 
(Singh 2004, pp. 29-30).  
In summary, India has established a federal system which includes a village level governing body. 
Sociological variables such as religion, the caste system and gender differences are likely to affect  
institutional arrangements around water. Centralized water management has been the norm in India but 
now there is a trend towards decentralized management.  This chapter also introduced the studied NGO, 
Hindustani Covenant Church. 
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5. Introducing a new system, a presentation of the project cycle 
In this chapter I will begin to present the empirical data extracted through the field study. The outline of 
this chapter follows the project cycle: project design, implementation, and operation and maintenance 
(according to Montogomery 1989, p. 90). Thus the empirical findings on two model variables: the direct 
actions on the active external agency (Ao) and the participation of villagers (Po), are given. These two 
variables must be presented in tandem because they to a large extent can be substitutes.  
The block development officer (BDO) has, as a representative of the Maharashtra government, the 
responsibility for implementing the government hand pump scheme in all villages of the taluka (Gasavi 
et.al. 2007). In Pandharpur this means responsibility for maintenance of 1 471 hand pumps in 94 villages. 
For this, four people are employed at taluka level. They also have a budget which allows for 10-15 
subsidized new hand pumps to be installed each year. 
HCC was in 2004, after three years of severe draught in the region, invited by the government to start 
working with the water issue in the two talukas of Pandharpur and Sangola. The government provided 
office facilities in the government campus in Pandharpur, where HCC set up their joint field office for both 
talukas with eight employees (Bhaskav et.al. 2007). A dialogue with government representatives decided 
which villages HCC should start working in (Bhaskav 2007). The work was started in 15 villages in 
Pandharpur and 15 in Sangola (ibid.).  
The comparative approach of this study implies that under each heading I first describe the government 
program and then describe HCC’s program. Since the HCC program introduces community management the 
practices in each village differs more within the HCC program than within the centralized practices of the 
government (the government shift towards community management has not yet had any larger impact in 
this region).  Thus more space in the following presentation is given to the HCC program.  
 
5.1 Project design 
Project design in the government scheme has gone through two stages according to government staff: (1) 
selection of villages and (2) selection of placement of the well (Gasvi et.al. 2007). According to HCC staff 
their program has four stages of project design: (1) selection of villages, (2) participatory rural appraisal 
(PRA), (3) selection of communities, (4) decisions on exact location. They emphasize that their approach is 
holistic and they see their introduction to the village as a rather long process (Bharskav 2007, Navdi 2007, 
Keskar 2007). The process from introduction to installation takes about six months (Bhaskav 2007). The 
issue of selecting villages is not included in this paper but the other steps are now presented. 
 
5.1.1 Learning more about the village 
After the decision to approach a village HCC organizes a Gram Sabha, were they present what they want to 
do in the village. If the villagers want to proceed, the initial meeting is soon followed by five days of 
meetings were HCC staff together with villagers conduct “participatory rural appraisal” (PRA). This is a 
process where the villagers together with the organization learn more about the village (Bhaskav 2007). 
During PRA HCC gathers a group of 20-30 people to share their knowledge about the village (ibid.). These 
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groups include both young and old people. The thirteen PRA-tools that HCC use include: area mappings of 
resources, social mappings of caste and religion, flow charts of income and expenditure, problem analysis 
in form of causal diagrams etc., see figure 5.1 for an illustration (HCC 2004).  This process often involves 
heavy discussion and disagreement among the participants (on issues such as on which side of the road a 
well is located) before they reach an agreement (Bhaskav 2007). Participants also tell how they learnt new 
things about their own village while participating in the PRA process. HCC supplements PRA by conducting 
village corner meetings where all people can participate in smaller groups of people discussing their 
situation. HCC introduced this method in 2004 (HCC 2004) and according to Navdi (2007) the aim is to make 
the villagers themselves able to do the next PRA session for continues work after the ongoing program has 
been implemented.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 One PRA document illustrating living patterns of caste communities within a village 
 
The gathered data for this study does not allow for any presentation of different outcomes of PRA in 
different villages or a presentation of who the stakeholders that influence this process most are. 
The government has a more technology based approach and do not do a PRA of the village (Gasavi et.al. 
2007).   
 
5.1.2 Decision to install a well 
After HCC has conducted its introduction program in the village it is the villagers’ decision to apply for 
participation in the bore well program (Bhaskav 2007). A group within the village can apply through the 
Gram Panchayat to HCC (ibid.). HCC’s budget, together with the size of the village, decides how many bore 
wells the organization is prepared to install in the village and how many hand pumps they are willing to 
repair (Navdi 2007). When the village applications have reached the NGO they once again call the Gram 
Sabha where it is decided which communities within the village that should get the installations (Bhaskav 
2007). The criterion from the NGO is that it should benefit the neediest people. With the help of mappings 
created through the PRA they facilitate a discussion where the NGO and the meeting reach a conclusion of 
which areas to target. 
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Three explanations of how the initiatives to join the program are given (for details see appendix 2). Most of 
the interviewed people said that all people came together and requested a pump after HCC had “created 
awareness” among them.  In one community in Wuni Chinchale and one in Medshingi they specify that it 
was the women who took initiative. In Wuni Chinchale it was an accident that led women to take the 
initiative for a new pump.  One woman had drowned when she accidently fell into the open well which 
triggered the community to search for alternatives.  
It happens, due to political conflicts, that the Gram Panchayat deny to forward the request and some 
people go directly to HCC to explain their interest. HCC will not start the work if it is not supported by the 
Gram Panchayat but they can help the group in the discussion with the Gram Panchayat. Bhaskav (2007) 
mention one such incident and at that occasion a little persuasion conducted by him was needed to get the 
Sarpanch to agree to the work being done.  
 
5.1.3 Decision on placement 
The decision on where in the village the government pumps will be installed has in the visited villages been 
taken by civil servants together with the Gram Panchayat. No Gram Sabha was involved.  This was for 
example explained in Huatakae Mangewalli: 
Q: “How was it decided where to place the hand pumps?” 
A: “Gram Panchayat and government decided. Government officials came to the village and said 
they would put three hand pumps here.” 
 (Huatakae Mangewalli villagers 2007)  
 
When I asked more about this they also clarified that there was no Gram Sabha arranged to discuss the 
issue. 
The new reformed version of the government program, implemented 2007, leave the decision for the Gram 
Sabha. However, this version of the government program had not been implemented in any of the studied 
villages at the time of this study. HCC’s approach thus differs. When HCC has accepted the application for a 
new pump a meeting is held in the area with the potential users of the hand pump. They are asked to 
decide exactly where to install the hand pump. Villagers are provided with groundwater surveys with 
information on where water can be found to base their decision on. It is a requirement from HCC that they 
agree to actively contribute ten per cent of the installation cost. This is mostly provided in-kind, i.e. stones 
and labour.  
Because of the big differences in availability of ground water (the situation can be completely different 
from one location to another even if they are only hundred meters apart) the hydrological surveys play the 
major role in the decision of location. This process is presented with statements like:  
“This position is the main [central] point decided by all members. This place is governments land so 
[there was] no objection. Of course this place is chosen for the survey of water.” 
(Umborgum pump users 2007a) 
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“They carried out geological survey and decided that this is the proper place for hand pump.” 
(Village V pump users 2007b) 
 
Only one case of disagreement was mentioned, people in Medshingi explained: 
“[There] was a discussion. The people living there demanded that it should be there and not here. But 
when we all come together we decided this is a proper place, center to all. The opposition [consisting of 
10-30 percent] is not happy. But now it’s ok.”  
(Medshingi pump users 2007b)  
The people giving the last statement also explained that the issue was decided in a discussion and that no 
voting took place during the meeting. 
 
5.2 Implementation 
When the village and location is decided it is time to install the bore well with hand pump. At the time of 
installation of the government pumps in the studied villages the locals did not contribute, neither money or 
in-kind, but they afterwards pay taxes for using the pump (Itaki villagers 2007: Huatakae Mangewalli 
villagers 2007).  The government pump was installed by government employees.  
In the HCC program it has been arranged differently. There is a fixed sum of ten percent of the installation 
cost which the community has to contribute (Bhaskav 2007). This is mostly paid in-kind. A Gram Sabha is 
called where the villagers themselves decide the form of contribution for each and every family. Some will 
provide stones, others will provide labour etc. The process comes natural according to the villagers; if 
someone has a tractor he will supply that (Village V pump users 2007a). The contribution must be physically 
shown before HCC add their part. The process is supervised jointly by village leaders and HCC but HCC does 
not interfere in the decision of who will provide what as explained by Bhaskav (2007): 
Q: “Is there a difference within the community what people can afford?” 
A: “Yes” 
Q: “How do you accommodate that?” 
A: “No, we do not do that. [We do not say] you pay that much, you pay that much. We are not 
involved in this process. They solve these things.” 
(Bhaskav 2007) 
 
HCC also makes it easier for the villagers to participate by thinking about the seasonal differences of the 
rural community: 
Q: “Is it easy to get the people to take the time to attend?”  
A: “But we conduct the training program and those types of activities in that period when they don’t 
have work. You can say, in rainy season, if there is regular rain that time they don’t have work in 
their field. Because if they have work in their field and we call them it may be some problem for 
them. So according to their time circle and according to their requirements.”  
(Bhaskav 2007) 
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5.3 Operation and Maintenance 
The hand pumps installed by the government are the property of the state government and the 
maintenance is the responsibility of the taluka level officials (Gasavi et.al. 2007), as the all India system 
described in chapter four. To cover the expenses for maintenance the government collect an annual water 
tax from the villages. In the village Gram Panchayat is responsible to report a brake down of the 
government pump to the BDO in the taluka (ibid.). When brake down is reported the BDO sends a mobile 
repair team to the village. According to the government staff in Pandharpur it takes up to two days for 
them to repair a pump (ibid.).  
The experience of the time for a BDO to repair it various greatly among villages. People in Diksal, Bohuli and 
Wuni Chinchale all agree it is a long process and Diksal specify it to two to three months. A completely 
different answer is given from Medsingi who says it takes only two days. The situation in the rest of the 
villages was not clarified. Talking to HCC staff and Municipal staff it is obvious that even this is a political 
question and politicians are involved in determining priorities (Bhaskav 2007, Gasavi et. al. 2007). Village 
with good connections with the government can thus have a much more positive experience of 
government support. The physical distance from the village to block office also matters. 
 
After the construction of pumps by HCC the idea is that a user group with all users should make a decision 
about maintenance of the hand pump. The hand pump becomes the property of the local community. One 
or more persons in every village, selected by the villagers, are also trained to do the maintenance of the 
hand pump. How many that are trained is decided by HCC based on village size (Bhaskav 2007). In 
Pandharpur there are 29 persons trained and in Sangola there are 34, out of these 30 are men and 33 are 
women (ibid.). The stated aim of HCC is to mainly train women (Sheikar Singh 2007). There are three 
categories of people trained; Community health volunteers, Gram Panchayat employees called pions, and 
other volunteers who are called civilians in table 5.1 (see appendix 2).How the villagers select their 
caretaker is somewhat unclear but in general people seem to have the opinion that a suitable person got 
the training. The information of who would be a good candidate to train seems to be given more informally 
to the NGO through PRA and discussions with users, it is not a formal decision in a meeting (Bhaskav 2007). 
People explain the reasons of choosing the person with the following: 
- “He normally takes initiative” (Narraj) 
- “He is interested in this field” (Waki) 
- “He had the capacity” (Waki) 
- “A proper person” (Diksal) 
- “He was most keen to get the training” (Wuni Chinchale) 
In some cases the person get paid to carry out the work and in some villages the person does it completely 
for free. The caretaker in Umborgum explains why he is doing it for free: 
“I am poor, they are also poor. I can help people who are like me. This is a great satisfaction for me. 
[...] When I attended [Gram Panchayat] meeting they talked about paying money because I take 
care of all the pumps but I said no, I don’t need because it is satisfaction for me that I’m doing some 
social work. This is enough for me. “ 
(Umborgum caretaker 2007) 
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The way people participate in maintenance in the villages were HCC has worked is presented in table 5.1 
and explained below. 
 
Table 5.1 Maintenance practices 
 Narraj Waki Village V Diksal Wuni 
Chinchale 
Medshingi Umbor-
gum 
Bohuli 
Respons-
ible to 
organize 
main-
tenance 
Maintenance 
person 
Gram 
Panchayat 
and 
maintenance 
person 
Gram 
Panchayat 
and 
maintenance 
person 
Gram 
Panchayat 
Gram 
Panchayat 
and 
informal 
leader 
Gram 
Panchayat 
Gram 
Panchayat 
and 
informal 
leader 
Informal 
leader 
Level of 
funding 
User group Village Village User 
group 
User 
group 
User 
group
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User 
group 
User 
group 
Who 
contribute 
Ten families - - All bene-
ficiaries 
All bene-
ficiaries 
All bene-
ficiaries 
All bene-
ficiaries 
All bene-
ficiaries 
People 
trained 
One One One One One One Several Several 
Who is 
trained 
Civilian Civilian Pion Civilian Civilian Unkown CHV, 
Pions, 
Civilians 
Pions and 
Civilians 
Payment 
for care 
taker  
No Yes Yes Unknown Unknown Unknown Yes Yes 
Local 
main-
tenance 
of all 
pumps 
No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Source: see appendix 2 
 
How the local community organize the utilization of this capacity (trained person with tools) is perhaps 
what differs most among villages. Some villages take care of all maintenance of all village pumps with this 
new capacity, including government provided pumps (see table 5.1).  
In some cases the maintenance person is also responsible for organizing the meetings where the decisions 
about maintenance are taken. In other villages Gram Panchayat organizes these meetings and in yet other 
villages there is a separate volunteer in each user group responsible for organizing meetings (see table 5.1).   
In two villages all funding for maintenance is taken from a village level common pool funded by taxes. In 
most villages the funding is organized locally around one hand pump with the specific beneficiaries 
covering the costs of maintenance of their specific pump (see table 5.1). In Wuni Chinchale and Umborgum 
the answer to the question of who organizes maintenance is that both the Gram Panchayat and a volunteer 
organize maintenance.  I find it to reveal the fact that if Gram Panchayat organizes maintenance of the 
hand pump in the main village the situation can be different in the hamlets outside the main village.  
Also the formalization of user groups differs. HCC staff (Bhaskav 2007, Navdi 2007, Singh 2007) talk about 
user groups as something existing for all hand pumps but even the villages that organize maintenance at 
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pump level do not have any formal organization for the specific pump. There is no elected committee for 
the user group and no elected president. If a formal organization with an elected committee and chairmen 
is present it is a committee at village level (see appendix 2).  
Another vulnerability with low number of people trained is exemplified by the experience from Wuni 
Chinchale were they have a system of local maintenance of all pumps. Here there is only one person 
trained. The trained person is a 22-year old male with ambitions, at several occasions away from the 
village.  The persons interviewed reported their experience  that it once took ten days to repair a broken 
hand pump because he was not directly available. So even if the village only has 15 hand pumps the 
maintenance capacity of having only one person trained makes it vulnerable.  
 
5.4. Sustainability of the program  
This section presents the result of the HCC program. Statistics about hand pump provision in the visited 
villages are first presented in table. 5.2.   
Table 5.2 Population and pumps 
Village Population Nr. Of government 
pump  
Nr. of HCC-
installed pumps  
Individuals 
per pump -  
before HCC 
program 
Individuals 
per pump -  
after HCC 
program 
Narraj 1300 3  4  433  185  
Waki 3000 6  5  500  272  
Village V 4100 30  6  136  113  
Diksal Unknown 12  3  Unknown Unknown 
Wuni Chinchale Unknown 12  Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Medshingi 7000 40  6  175  152  
Umborgum 2500 19  2  131  119  
Bohuli Unknown 20  4  Unknown Unknown 
      
Reference villages not assisted by HCC: 
Itaki  786 7 0 112  - 
Hutakae 
Mangewalli  
1600 6 0 266  - 
Source:  All numbers in the table are given by village informants and HCC staff.  
 
As stated in the aim of the study I investigate two dependent variables as indicators of sustainable drinking 
water management, one: user satisfaction with the functioning of the bore well and two: existence of 
institution for maintenance of the bore well. 
In every HCC program village beneficiaries express a clear satisfaction with the working conditions of their 
new hand pump (see appendix 1). The dissatisfaction, when mentioned, is with the number of available 
bore wells and/or the situation in the summer season. Examples of statements are: 
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“We are satisfied with the installation. […] The problem is in summer season, at that time we must 
carry water.” 
 (Diksal pump user 2007a) 
“All the bore wells are in good condition. All having good water. Not a single bore failed here.” 
 (Waki pump users 2007a) 
“It’s good water. Sufficient for all, all year around. [But] 46 bore wells are not sufficient for this 
area. The need [for more wells] is outside the main village in remote areas. 7-8 pumps more is 
demanded.” 
 (Medshingi pump users 2007a) 
 
The last statement should be understood as they have enough water in the well they are using but the 
number of wells in place is not sufficient to meet the demands of the village.  
All HCC pumps that had enough water were properly functioning (see appendix 2). The villagers reported 
that all those that had malfunctioned had been properly maintained within 10 days. Several of the visited 
communities had not yet been in need to try its maintenance institution.   
 
5.5 More development work in the same villages 
Drinking water is often the number one priority among the villagers but HCC’s holistic approach to village 
development also includes other areas. The same development workers from HCC continue to work in the 
villages on other needs of the people (Bhaskav et. al. 2007). In the ongoing program they plan to stay for at 
the most six years in the same village. The work being done is, according to Bhaskav (2007); Navdi (2007); 
Keskar (2007), related to:  
• Sanitation: as building latrines and educating people on health issues. 
• Water harvesting: building water harvesting structures. 
• Farming: as educating farmers about composting and using the right amount of water for each 
crop. 
• Forming different community groups: farmers’ groups, women’s groups and youth groups. 
• Small businesses: Helping women starting goat rearing, candle making etc.    
HCC uses the same approach on every issue they work on. They demand an active participation and 
contribution from the villagers and only subsidize constructions, they never provide anything but education 
and advice for free (ibid.).  
One teacher in Diksal explains that their village has changed: 
“Nowadays people have come very aware of their social responsibility. They cooperate now so that 
attitude has changed. The change was because of the hand pumps, because they are now 
contributing. Before the attitude were myself. “ 
(Diksal pump users 2007) 
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HCC plans to work in each village only for a limited period of time and then be able to leave. HCC’s regional 
managers state this clearly but the field staff and villagers have hesitations about that HCC will really leave 
the village at the end of the given timeframe. But some villages carry on with the development of the 
village by their own before HCC is scheduled to leave. For example Waki has joined a Maharasthra 
government program to establish a conflict free village (Waki pump users 2007) and Diksal has constructed 
a new road in their village by contributing 10% in a government program (Diksal pump users 2007). 
In summery, management regimes can differ on all stages of the project cycle. Also other characteristics 
differs among the studied villages, these characteristics are presented in the following chapter.   
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6.  Village characteristics  
The analytical framework presented in chapter two (see section 2.3.2) specifies group characteristics, 
institutional characteristics and the external environment as important to understand how well 
participation works to achieve sustainability. This chapter presents the findings on these issues in the 
studied villages.   
The comparative method used in this study implies that under each heading I first describe the village 
characteristics before HCC started their work and then describe if and how HCC has affected this. This 
chapter follows Agrawal’s research summery introduced in chapter two and presented in more detail in 
appendix 1. 
 
6.1 Group characteristics 
Agrawal (2004) identifies a number of characteristics that affect the possibility to set up sustainable local 
management institutions; group size, clarity of group boundaries, social capital, appropriate leadership, 
interdependence among group members, homogeneity of identities and interest, and level of poverty. .  In 
addition I would like to add human capital since local people themselves refer to their limited knowledge as 
a problem for village development. 
 
6.1.1 Group size and boundaries 
Many people in this region live scattered in small hamlets and in single family settlements on the field 
(observation). For example in Medshingi, with a total population of 7000, 2000 people live outside the main 
village and in Umborgum with a total population of 2500, 1500 live outside the main village (Medshingi 
pump users 2007; Umborgum pump users 2007).The users of one hand pump are normally a group of 100-
300 people when it is placed outside the main village (see appendix 2). In the main village the group of 
users would add up to 500 people.  
The initial group of people contributing to the construction of a new bore well with the help of HCC will be 
requested to be at least ten families (Bhaskav 2007). This means that HCC will start their work, even though 
many people in the area will have hesitations about contributing, if the group taking initiative is large 
enough, and this is often the case (Bhaskav 2007). I was told that when people not participating in the 
construction phase end up using the hand pump, and experience the maintenance process working, more 
and more people join the group of people participating in maintenance. This is expressed in Village V: 
“There is no rule hindering the people who have not contributed to use the pump. Say that some 
people are so poor that we can’t take money from that people. The one who didn’t contribute at 
first [later] say now we are ready to contribute.” 
(Village V pump users 2007b) 
Thus, the group of people participating in construction and the group that participate in maintenance are of 
different sizes and even more people will utilize the pump. The large number of people in the villages that 
migrate seasonally as sugar cane cutters also effect group numbers and group boundaries.  
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6.1.2 Social capital 
When it comes to social capital one can analytically differentiate between structural social capital and 
cognitive social capital (Mikkelsen 2005, p. 248-249). Structural social capital means “relatively external and 
externally observable social structures, such as networks and associations [...], and the rules and procedure 
they embody” (ibid, 248). Cognitive social capital means the more “subjective and intangible elements such 
as generally accepted attitudes and norms of behaviour, shared values, reciprocity and trust” (ibid). This 
study allows for a discussion of structural social capital but my attempts to be able to clarify to what extent 
the villagers share norms etc. has been limited. This due to that the line of questioning that could reveal 
these intangible elements is much more time consuming and the language barrier makes this abstract line 
of discussion with informants difficult.    
The issue of initial structural social capital in the villages is an issue of limited social capital. The only formal 
village organization is the elected body of the Gram Panchayat and its potential committees. Committees 
can take responsibility for the village development in different areas. For example in Narraj they have 
water-, health-, education-, cleaning- and health care committees (Narraj pump user 2007c). 
In villages where no government agency or NGO have recently worked the Gram Panchayat meets as 
seldom as two times a year and has no Gram Sabha (Hutakae Mangewalli villagers 2007; Itaki villagers 
2007). In villages with more contact with government schemes or NGO:s the elected body is more active 
and gather the whole village to discuss common issues at Gram Sabha. 
People indicate that it is the many religious festivals that make people come together (see appendix 2). 
Before the festivals they also work together to organize the events. For example in one visited village loud 
speakers announced that it was time to pick up some sugar from the Gram Panchayat office to prepare 
candy for the up-coming festival (observation). Also weddings are occasions when the villagers come 
together. People explain that Muslims and Hindus in the villages often join the celebrations of each other’s 
religious festivals. They put this in contrast to religious relations in cities where such interactions do not 
take place. 
When people are asked about common locally owned property they often say that they have none. When 
this question was asked again with a specific reference to the temple, which was observable in the village 
they replied that of course that was such a locally owned common property. People collectively gather 
funds for the temple.  
Adopting a gender perspective to social capital gives special insight. When walking through a village not 
involved with NGO:s one can, for example see men gather to play cards together (observation in Huatakae 
Mangewalli 2007-10-23). When talking to women they unanimously state that there was no contact 
between women of different households before HCC initiated it (Village W women’s group2007, Khardi 
2007; Mathwest 2007). When I asked the women in a women’s group in Village W if the group of women 
meet before the women’s group was started by HCC the following answer was given by the interpreter 
summarizing the women’s discussion:  
“Before we couldn’t talk to each other. [Now] we started to discuss in-between us, and now we 
collect money and take good decisions just like goat rearing. Before we could not come together 
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and take decisions. Before no decision on family problems
35
.” 
 (Village W women´s group 2007) 
 
The interviewed women also express that the previous isolation made them not participating in village 
meetings (ibid.). Bhaskav’s experience is somewhat different and his opinion is that women also previously 
were the most active in religious festivals arrangements (Bhaskav 2007). In some villages the Gram 
Panchayat has supported the starting of two or three women’s groups on the initiative of the government, 
but the actual activity rate of these groups has been very low (Itaki villagers 2007).  
In the main village people live in distinct caste communities while in hamlets people of different castes live 
mixed (Bhaskav 2007). In the caste mixed areas people of different castes work together to resolve the 
water issue. Especially this is true for women who meet in caste mixed groups.  
HCC introduces a complete program that will affect social capital in the village. Women’s groups, youth 
groups and farmer’s groups are started where people are brought together and discuss and try to solve 
common problems or individual problems where one needs assistance.  
 
6.1.3 Human capital  
Human capital is not listed by Agrawal, but people themselves often referred to the importance of 
“guidance” or new knowledge. The official statistics says that the male literacy rate in the district is 82.0 
percent and the female literacy rate is 59.8 percent. People themselves often say that they have only five 
or six years of schooling.  When asked about their views about the future with the villagers from “Village V” 
said:  
“Education is the difference that will make us maintain the hand pump in the future. “ 
(Village V pump users 2007) 
They also say: 
“The awareness of not to damage the pump is there.” 
(Village V pump users 2007) 
In the reference village of Huatakae Mangewalli the only government scheme known to the people is that 
of the work guarantee scheme even though the Maharashtra government has several rural development 
schemes running, including that of hand pump provision (Huatakae Mangewalli villagers 2007).  And even 
the knowledge about the known scheme is limited. According to the schemes all villagers are supposed to 
be involved, through Gram Sabha, in the decisions of what work is to be carried out in the program. This is 
not known to the villagers who participate in the program but state that there are no opportunities 
available to them for the development of their village. There is never any Gram Sabha arranged in the 
village and the government information to the village never passes from the Gram Panchayat to the rest of 
the village. The Gram Panchayat only consists of three people that meet twice a year.  
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 Women in all three visited women’s saving groups state that one function of the group is to help solve family problems of its 
group members. For example in Village W they reported that one of the group members had not been accepted by her in-laws and 
this became a case handled by the group (Village W 2007). 
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6.1.4 Leadership 
The only mentioned leadership in the non-project villages is that of the Gram Panchayat (Hutakae 
Mangewalli villagers 2007; Itaki villagers 2007).  There are two main ways people from outside the village 
explain the workings of village elections (Bhaskav 2007, Patil 2007, Keskar & Wagh 2007). One is that 
people vote on the base of caste, the other is that people vote for the one spending most money on the 
election campaign.  
“[...] they will see oh now the person, richer person who spend more gets elected very easily. What 
he told doesn’t matter. [...] What work I have done doesn’t matter. “ 
(Keskar & Wagh 2007) 
 
But there are some reservations: 
“Now there are reservations for backwards
36
, and other classes, a richer person can’t get that. Then 
a proper person can get elected.” 
(Keskar & Wagh 2007) 
 
This issue has not been thoroughly discussed with the villagers but the woman Sarpanch in Narraj explained 
her own success by: 
“I’m not much educated. I just went to school to the fifth standard. But because of my experience, 
because of my knowledge, people appreciate  and support me. “ 
(Narraj pump users 2007c) 
 
Political leaders are very keen on facilitating resources to their own constituency and in some cases actively 
working against that resources are made available to people from the political opposition (Bhaskav 2007). 
Even though the issue of corruption was not discussed with the villagers directly, the broad picture from 
other informants is that corruption has a solid place in politics in the region (Sharad 2007, Bhaskav 2007, 
Baliram et.al. 2007). Bhaskav (2007) explains it as that there is a common understanding that it is 
understandable if the elected person channel a little bit of extra money into his own hand because he 
spends so much on his election campaign. 
In the villages where HCC has been working, leadership of two kinds appears leading water management. 
The elected leadership of the Gram Panchayat, working as explained above, and the leadership of socially 
responsible people in the village who takes initiatives that people follow voluntarily. I use the villagers’ 
expressions of “Gram Panchayat-members” and “leaders” to differentiate the two.  
There are also existing elected leaders of different groups in the village, such as presidents of women’s- and 
farmers groups present in the village. When asked about whom they elect for leader of non-political 
groups, such as the women’s group, the answers are similar to that of the women in Khardi: 
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 The backwards are the ones considered the lowest rang in the caste hierarchy, actually viewed as not belonging to a caste, these 
are also called Hijans or Dalits. 
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“[…] good life, good personality and good knowledge.“ 
(Khardi womens group 2007) 
 
The leader can be presented as: 
“He´s just a common man, educated to the fifth standard. But he knows about the problems of this 
region.”  
(Narraj pump users 2007a) 
 
One group of people that becomes important for the development of the village is the “Community health 
volunteer” (CHV). The CHV was introduced by a World Bank program but is today supported by HCC 
(Bhaskav 2007). These people are generally female teachers (Bhaskav 2007). Their responsibilities were at 
first to track the village development on health issues by doing household surveys (ibid.).  Today the CHV 
themselves explain their role in general as “rural development through participation and education”
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(Indapur CHV 2007).  The CHVs’ explain how they are active in Gram Sabha and ask questions that force 
Gram Panchayat members to explain their decisions in a way that has not been happening before, for 
example they are aware of national laws demanding a certain percentage of Gram Panchayat resources to 
be targeting to women’s development and check that this is implemented (ibid.). HCC gives special training 
for them regularly (Survanshi 2007). 
 
6.1.5 Other group characteristics  
The other group characteristics put forward by CPR theory are: Interdependence among group members 
and levels of poverty. Interdependence of group members is found low. The basic unit is the family which 
works together to provide what is needed for its members, interaction in-between families has not been 
mentioned as being part of the solution to any of the basic needs of people. When asking people in villages 
not involved in any developing program about what is needed for the development of their village the 
answers given were only answers of individual improvements of people or families (i.e. solution to 
problems of unemployment) and nothing about issues of collective nature were mentioned (Hutakae 
Mangewalli villagers 2007; Itaki villagers 2007). The one thing that I have been able to identify that was 
previously addressed by collective action is transport of the harvest to the market (Keskar 2007).  
The region experiences high levels of poverty. These people live in clay huts with straw roofs and their only 
belongings are clothes and cutlery (observation).  But also richer people that live in brick houses, owning 
items such as a motorcycle and a TV with satellite dish could also be facing drinking water problems, 
getting their drinking water from an open well (observation; Village W women’s group 2007).  
                                                            
37
 The CHV themselves give the following examples of their role: health guides, giving drinking water, creating gender awareness, 
confidence building in women, teach how to behave in public places, teach how to take care of public property, teaching self help 
groups, working for liquor ban, organising legal education camp and waste water management etc. 
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6.2 Relationship between resource system and group characteristics 
Agrawal (2001) explains how the group must be matched to the resource to allow for sustainability, for 
example if the group’s dependence on the resource is high the probability that it will be well maintained is 
higher. Regarding the dependence on a specific hand pump there is a difference between people living in 
the main village and people living outside. In the main village there are always several pumps and if one has 
a problem the people can often easily choose to use another. For the people living outside the village their 
nearest hand pump is often the only available water source except for open wells with lower quality of 
water, and thus a strong dependence of the specific hand pump is in place.  
When people in Narraj discussed the maintenance issue they refer to their strong dependence of the pump 
to explain what happens when their pump brakes down: 
 
“The meeting is called as soon as possible because there are no other source here. We can solve it in 
one or two days. When it is not working we really haven´t got any source, we come together 
because we don’t have any other option.“ 
(Narraj pump users 2007a) 
 
 
This general relationship is not altered by the HCC program since they mainly install bore wells in places 
where people, due to the long distance to existing wells, have been restricted to use only open wells.  
 
All people share a belief that “water is life”. People not involved with a HCC program translate this to that it 
therefore should be provided by the government. Maintenance of common property is thus the 
responsibility of the government.  
 
6.3 Institutional arrangements 
Regarding institutional arrangements Agrawal (2001) point towards rules and how they are enforced. 
Sustainable local management of resources follows,  according to theory, of: (1) easily understood rules, (2) 
that are developed locally, (3) where sanctions for rule braking comes graduate, (4) adjudication is 
availability at low cost, (5) and there exists accountability of the monitors. 
The rules I have identified are of three kinds: rules about how to properly use the pump mechanism, rules 
restricting the amount of water to use and rules about contributing to the funding. In the non-project 
villages no rules of the two first kinds exists: 
Q: ” Do they have any special rules about how to use the hand pump?” 
A: “No” 
(Itaki villagers 2007) 
 
The funding is in the government water regime covered by a head tax per family were everyone pays the 
same amount independent of income or water usage (Gasavi et. al. 2007).   
In almost all the project villages only the first type of rule was active. These rules were taught by HCC at a 
training session by each new or repaired hand pump. The rules include such things as keep the pump area 
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clean, do not wash clothes near the pump, and use the handle carefully so it does not get broken. Many 
express that there is no need of putting such simple rules in writing; there are more of a common sense 
type: 
“We are the ones who will not get water here if anyone do some damage with this one. It’s not rules 
on paper. There is general contact between people here so we have general rules. We are having 
good knowledge about that one.” 
(Narraj pump users 2007a) 
 
The same people also say the following about the rules: 
“It is a heritage, it’s a culture, it´s a tradition that we have these rules. So we accept we should not 
make dirt here […].” 
(Narraj pump users 2007a) 
  
Villagers also explain that all rules about the proper way to use the pump are taught to them by HCC and 
villagers themselves have not participated in altering them locally. Informants explain: 
“The people from your organization came here and taught that […] and there should not be any dirt 
here. And of course awareness is spread here.” 
(Wuni Chinchale pump user 2007a) 
 
“There is a common understanding that we are taking care of this one and we should use properly. 
The awareness of these rules started since the HCC put the pumps here and it spread and people are 
now aware. Before that there was nothing in place.” 
(Medshingi pump users 2007a) 
 
In one village I found rules restricting the amount of water to be used. Users around one well had agreed 
among themselves that the water from the bore well could only be used for human drinking and the 
watering of animals must thus be solved by other means to save water during summer months (Medshingi 
pump users 2007b).  
In general there seems to be little conflict over utilization and the statements are in line with this statement 
from Narraj:  
“There is no conflict there. Ok, sometimes it´s conflict, I take first and then you take. They are solved 
by group discussion with the elected members of the Gram Panchayat, they discuss with them, all 
the conflict. They are not serious conflicts.” 
 (Narraj pump users 2007a) 
 
There are no rules about having to contribute to installation or maintenance to use the wells. People 
explain: 
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“They are ten [families] and they collected per [family] 350 rupees. They shared this equally.  [But] 
all people get water. [We] don’t put any restriction of those who do not share money.” 
 (Narraj pump users 2007a) 
 
People contributing say that they believe the ones not contributing will do so in the future or have reasons 
for not contributing, as being very poor. 
The enforcement of existing rules in the project villages are explained in two ways in the five villages where 
the issue has been clarified
38
. The first approach is that it is the responsibility of the Gram Panchayat (or 
committee) members (the situation in Narraj, Waki, Medsingi, and Village V). The normal approach is then 
that one of the Gram Panchayat members first approaches the person in question and instructs him to 
change his behaviour. If this is not followed a Gram Panchayat meeting can fine the person. The other 
alternative is that there is a certain person, not elected in any formal way, that has taken as his duty to 
enforce the rules by watching and when misbehaviour is found his reply is to instruct his fellow community 
members on correct behaviour (Bohuli pump users 2007). The jurisdiction of the person picking up this 
responsibility seems to be recognized by people in the community.  
 
6.4 Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements 
The CPR theorists suggest that rules restricting use to match the resource are important. Restrictions on 
harvesting water in the summer have been found put in place in only one studied village. Not all wells dry 
up in summer so the need for this is not universal. The need is also eased when complementing structures 
for the bore well are installed, such as roof water harvesting connected to the bore well (Bhaskav 2007; 
Baliram et.al. 2007).    
 
6.5 External environment 
Under the heading of external environment Agrawals (2001) identifies the technology being used, the 
community’s relations with the external market and its relation with the state.  
 
6.5.1 The technology for exclusion 
Agrawal suggests two factors of the technology to be important; one: the cost of the technique for 
excluding people from using the resource and two: the time for adapting to this technique.  
As already explained people do not see any moral or legal possibility of excluding people from using the 
pump put in place on public land. Therefore is no technique in place in any visited community that hinders 
any people from using the hand pumps.  
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6.5.2 The external market 
According to Agrawal’s (2001) lesser articulation with the external market gives better possibility for 
sustainable local CPR institutions. I can not identify anyone interested in selling water from this draught 
prone area on the external market so this is not relevant in this case.  
 
6.5.3 The state government 
In chapter four and five I presented the villages’ relationship with the government regarding water 
provision before the HCC program was carried out. Agrawal (2001) indicates that the central government 
can support or undermine the local authority. Therefore the government’s role in the villages where HCC 
has carried out their work is now presented.   
Government officials will only visit the village on request from the village Gram Panchayat. The property 
rights regarding the HCC installed pumps are, however, unclear. As presented above access to hand pumps 
on public land, which include the HCC-pumps, is never restricted. But the state government will not fund 
their maintenance (Bhaskav 2007). HCC wish it to be the property of the user group (Bhaskav 2007) but in 
many villages the village in the form of the Gram Panchayat is perceived as the owner:   
“It´s public property, part of the Gram Panchayat.” 
(Diksal pump users 2007a) 
 
In villages where HCC has installed some wells and trained local caretakers the government will also 
continue to maintain government installed pumps when requested (Gasavi et. al. 2007). This service is 
subsidized when government employees are utilized but there is no possibility for extracting government 
funds for local maintenance (ibid.).  There was and is no government agency conducting external 
monitoring or sanctions that interact with the village on their own initiative (Gasavi et.al 2007).  
The central government recognizes the local governing body of Gram Panchayat which it has instituted 
(Government of India 2007). Connected to the Gram Panchayat it is also possible for the village to formally 
introduce committees taking responsibility for certain issues, such as water committees. There is no such 
clear formal recognition of organized user groups.  
Smaller group constructions is started to get public recognition. Outside Aurangabad women’s group 
reported that they could get micro finance credit (Keskar 2007b) but women’s groups in Pandharpur had 
not the possibility of getting accepted as a formally recognized group acceptable for loans (Village W 2007).  
 
In summery, this chapter includes statements from the informants, and the observations I made, regarding 
characteristics of the studied groups and their institutional characteristics. This is, together with the findings 
presented in chapter five, discussed in the following chapter. 
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7. Analysis and discussion 
The empirical findings has been presented as the project cycle of HCC´s water program, in comparison to 
the previous water regime, and as some characteristics of the local community that CPR theory has 
suggested to be important for the research question.   
In chapter three a model specification was introduced: 
Quality of operation and maintenance (Qo) = f(Po, Ao) + µ 
 
where Ao is an exogenous variable and Po is an endogenous variable given by 
 
 
Po = f (G1, G2 , … , Gn, Io) + µ 
 
where all G:s are exogenous variables for group characteristics (level of social capital, group size etc.), while 
Io  is an index variable weighting the institutional settings affecting operation and maintenance.  
 
This analysis starts with the results of the HCC water program (Qo). After that the four areas I believe to be 
most important regarding the rest of the variables are discussed. The method to find these four variables 
has been the comparative institutional analysis. A summary of this comparative exercise is found in 
appendix 2 and 3. 
Under each heading in this chapter I try to discuss the condition regarding the variable in the previous 
management regime in contrast to what changes have been induced.  
 
7.1 A resource system suitable for local management 
The resource system is of small size with very well defined boundaries, consisting of the ground water 
available in the bore well. The predictability of the system seems to become quite high after a few years 
use, when the villagers learn from experience the seasonal variation of water availability. Thus according to 
Agrawal (2001) the resource system as such is suitable for introducing community management.  
 
7.2 Sustainability of local management 
HCC has been installing subsidized wells in village communities for nearly 40 years. As presented in the 
background chapter, section 4.4, they at first restricted their work to install the well and then directly hand 
over the responsibility to the local community. Using this approach they experienced the great problems of 
pumps being not properly maintained. They have since introduced a more holistic approach, involving all 
villagers in the process and extended their work in the villages.  
Today the indicator “user satisfaction” shows that two to three years after the installations most people are 
still satisfied with the services (presented in section 5.4). The problem seems to be insufficient ground 
water coverage in summer. I return to this issue in section 7.8, discussing the need of complementing 
technology.  
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At the time of the study all wells that had sufficient water were reported to be in working condition. This 
could at first be seen as an indicator that proper maintenance institution was active in all villages. But the 
choice of methodology has made the conclusion on the maintenance institution more problematic. One 
year was thought as enough time to be able to clearly find if a sustainable regime was in place or not (if the 
pump was working or not). Based on statements from HCC staff members that a bore well could be 
malfunctioning in three months if not looked after properly (Bhaskav 2007). However, the study has 
showed that with proper use of the hand pump it will keep on working for two years or more without any 
need of maintenance. Therefore it is difficult to conclude if the system is sustainable when higher pressure 
is put on the system as it gets older. I thus have been forced to rely on a more subjective judgement of the 
sustainability of its maintenance institution, a situation similar to that of Manikutty’s (1998) study of 
another Maharashtra drinking water program carried out too early in the project cycle.   
Given this restriction,  findings are that the water program in the studied villages is a success. I base this on 
that all interviewed people could explain how maintenance is planned to be carried out once the pump 
malfunction. In the three villages where the wells have malfunctioned they have also been repaired within 
ten days. The institutional settings in all eight studied villages have moved to, with the terminology of Aoki 
(2005, p. 7) a new institutional equilibrium where the villagers take care of maintenance of the new 
installed hand pumps. In some villages the two institutional systems are running parallel, with the village 
doing the maintenance of the HCC installed pumps and the BDO doing maintenance of government 
installed pumps. Interesting is that in most villages the new management regime becomes dominant and 
the local community takes responsibility for all pumps including government installed pumps.  
In summary, the historical information about HCC shows that their work at first did not produce sustainable 
local management regimes but when they have incorporated more and more activities in their program this 
has come to change.  
 
7.3 Institutions 
7.3.1 Participation and its incentives 
Previous to HCC a centrally arranged management regime was in place and the formal responsibility of the 
local community was restricted to report malfunctioning.  
Due to the fact that state government has not shown the capacity to quickly repair the hand pumps when 
malfunctioning people find economic incentives to take over this responsibility locally. This insufficient 
capacity of the state government is widespread all over India (see Narain 2006, Kolsky et.al. 2004).  Narain 
(2006) finds that it has been impossible to recover cost of the capital investment and operation and 
maintenance of the system from the farmers. This has led to a brake down of the systems.  
Most people could not privately afford to install their own bore well and thus a public solution is the 
possibility. The need for a specific hand pump to be in working condition is not as important in the main 
village as compared to an area outside the main village. Therefore the incentive for hand pump 
maintenance is stronger in hamlets. Outside the main village one group of users will always live close only 
to the one hand pump, making their connection to that specific water source strong. 
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Local common ownership creates the incentives for effective participation in decision making, construction, 
monitoring and maintenance. But the idea that drinking water should be provided by the government is 
deeply rooted in the minds of the villagers. They have little experience of property not being either private 
or government owned. For the local common ownership to be trustworthy it both demands a contribution 
from the villagers and clarity of the exit strategy of the implementing organization. Villagers must believe 
that the implementing organization will not be a backup supplier of last resort, giving support if the 
villagers fail to organize maintenance on their own.  
Local common ownership is something that needs to be learnt. Peoples understanding of the state has to 
be changed. That the institutional setting does become deeply transformed is indicated by the reports of 
villages, after HCC:s program has been implemented, take initiative to participate in government subsidized 
projects with their own contribution. 
In summary, from a strictly economic perspective there seems to be economic rationality for local 
maintenance. Important is to get people, who are not used to cooperate is this way, to trust that good 
things will come if they apply to some rules in a continuing interaction. 
To understand more about when this approach is successful and not I now continue the search for more 
institutional change (not just local ownership) that accompany HCC:s programme. 
 
7.3.2 Need of rules and their enforcement 
Two areas of rules are found affecting the water system: Rules about how to use the pump properly and 
rules about financial contributions. According to CPR theory rules restricting access are also important for 
sustainable resource management.    
Before HCC started to work in the program villages  there were no rules about how to use the hand pump. 
There were no rules limiting access or the amount of water to be used. Funding was covered by a per capita 
tax paid by all.  
HCC introduce rules about how to use the pump to minimize wear. The rules are taught orally at a training 
session and the villagers understand why these rules are important and quickly incorporate them. They 
even express that these are commonsense rules that have always been there. If someone breaks the rules 
they are approached by Gram Panchayat members who have the official power to enforce such rules. 
Based on the interviews and litterature  it seems as if these rules increase the working time of the hand 
pumps significantly. 
Strangely enough people did not seem to mind that people are allowed to use the pump independently of 
if they contributed to construction or contribute to maintenance or not. In the continuing use and 
maintenance more and more people seem to join the group contributing to maintenance. People 
themselves otherwise refer to “the great need” to explain why they and others contribute. There is no 
institution for cohesion to contribution based on formal power.  That anyone contributes in this 
institutional setting contradicts CPR theory.  But there could be other institutions making the system work, 
e.g. guilt or other informal rules that weren’t revealed in this study. The system for deciding individual 
contribution in an open meeting does probably have an enforcing effect, as suggested by Narain (2006). 
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Only in one village a tax system is reported to have been introduced with the new system to finance all 
pumps in the community by a communal fund.  
The community around one hand pump had introduced water saving rules for the summer months. No 
other community experiencing water shortage had introduced such rules. Unfortunately it was not possible 
to find the reason behind this. 
In summary, proper usage rules limit the need for maintenance and are followed if they are properly 
introduced to the villagers. Rules restricting the amount of water to use in summer were almost not found. 
Contribution to maintenance is not mandatory and the mechanism for making people to contribute even 
though they know some people do not is non-formal. The interesting finding is that the system seems to 
work well-enough anyway.  
 
7.4 Group characteristics 
7.4.1 A situation of limited human capital  
Agrawal (2001) does not directly recognize human capital as a factor to consider but I found it interesting. It 
inflicts on peoples rationality. In villages not guided by an NGO there seems to be little knowledge about 
development possibilities and the opportunity costs of continuing to live in the traditional way. 
When discussing what has been the major impact of HCC as well as discussing the exit of HCC with villagers 
the need for “guidance” seems to stand out. Especially when asking women they need guidance to new 
knowledge to a much greater extent than material things. People in the program villages to some extent 
now talk about their decisions in terms of opportunity costs. They have much better understanding about 
what is at stake.  
For a participatory strategy to be successful the villagers must be guided to some new knowledge such as 
learning more about one’s own village, learning about the possibilities available to the village and learning 
about the opportunity costs of not taking action. Of course it is important that this is done in a transparent 
manner where the villagers have the possibility of questioning the new ideas so it continues to be a 
participatory process. 
What is left to resolve is how this guidance will be provided after HCC is scheduled to leave. Connecting the 
villagers to an information source seems to be needed. News media could perhaps fill this gap.  One other 
interesting suggestion is thus from Patil. He argues the benefits of investing in village information centers 
with internet connection; these could be used for tracking market prices on crops, weather conditions, and 
information about new technology etc. (Patil in Baliram et.al. 2007).  
 
7.4.2 A situation of limited social capital 
I find most group characteristics to speak against the possibilities of these communities to be able to 
sustainably manage a CPR (these finding holds both for initial conditions of the program villages and of the 
present condition of the reference villages) (see section 6.2). If one generalize; there are no clear 
boundaries of the user community, the existence of previous social capital is low, the political leadership is 
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perceived as corrupt and mostly look to special interests of a certain group, there is low previous 
interdependence among group members and there is a high level of poverty. The study does not provide 
clarity on the other group characteristics indicated in appendix 1. The overall situation does however not 
seem bright. This would explain why HCC’s previous approach has failed.  
Outside the main villages these negative factors are somewhat balanced by what Agrawal (2001) classifies 
as the relationships between the resource system and group characteristics. In hamlets and for those living 
scattered in the fields there is a very strong dependence of the specific hand pump. 
The main issue, I believe, is that of social capital. One major change in the villages that people mention is an 
increase in cooperation and participation in community groups. If measured, it is most likely that one can 
find and increase in social capital in these villages. A higher level of social capital makes it possible to 
overcome the negative impacts of the other group variables. I also suspect that the level of social capital is 
the easiest factor to influence.  
The limited social capital in rural Indian communities mainly stems from religious institutions. Even though 
religion and everyday life is closely connected in the Indian society it seems to be a barrier of utilizing 
experiences achieved in the religious sphere in the development of the village. People themselves never 
mention religious institutions during the interviews except when asked directly about it. In only one village 
people mentioned the Hindu shrine as an important place due to its function as the place of everyday 
meetings and general discussion of the men in the community.  
A little bit ironically, it thus becomes the role of a church-based NGO:s to invest in the secular social capital 
of the village. Because, even though not presenting it in the terms of social capital, HCC takes the lack of 
social capital into consideration when starting to work in a village. They see the issue of starting the work as 
a six month process in contrast to that of the Maharashtra government scheme which mostly just organize 
one meeting in the village where the whole issue is resolved (or not). One could see it as a two stage 
approach for social mobilization (externally assisted investment in social capital). The first part is before the 
installation; holding meetings where the villagers become trained in public interaction (at village level and 
at “corner-level”). This is also supplemented with the start of women’s groups which give a needed special 
focus on women resulting in a more active engagement of women in village meetings than otherwise 
possible.  The second part is continuing support of village development after the hand pump is installed or 
repaired. This means engaging people in other development projects and forming more and more women’s 
groups, youth groups and farmer’s groups during six years before they leave the village.  
When applying a gender perspective on the issue of social capital one could clearly see that the matter of 
women’s social capital is even more severe. There seems to be almost no female social capital available. 
The implanting agency thus needs to give more attention to women´s situation than men’s in the initial 
face to get a balanced program, a program that at the end benefits women and men equally. Getting more 
women active will also improve the project.  
One question is the clarity of the concept of “user group”. Within this study it has not been possible to 
clarify the level of formalization of user groups. HCC refer to all communities located around one hand 
pump as a user group independently of if there is any regular meetings of the group, an elected leadership 
of the group or something else that would indicate some formalization of these groups. The level of 
formalization actually seems to differ greatly between different locations.  The results from a study of a 
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program in Karnataka showed that such ad-hoc formation of user groups can work during the 
implementation face but has difficulties in achieving sustainable participation (Manikutty, 1998, p. 379). 
This indicates that HCC would benefit if they put clarity to what kind of user group functioning they 
envisions to be running when it withdraws from the villages.  
In summary, the prevailing situation in the villages before HCC started their work was, if analyzed through 
CPR theory, not facilitating conditions for sustainable CPR management. Larger external investments in 
activities building social capital have in this case changed the situation. 
 According to Isham and Kähkönen (2002) social mobilization could be a sufficient intervention, but the 
villagers talk about different “key persons” lead me to the next conclusion. 
 
7.4.3 A situation of available leadership capacity  
CPR theorists suggests that the leadership of the community should be young and familiar with changing 
life conditions but at the same time connected to the local traditional elite, in order to facilitate sustainable 
CPR solutions. Thus I have discussed the issue of leadership and initiative with the villagers.  
In the discussions with users the term “key person” was found to be a useful term to understand the 
functioning of the maintenance organization around the hand pump. The key person could be the 
repairmen, a Gram Panchayat member, a former Gram Panchayat member, the CHV or someone else. In all 
focus groups where the question was asked the informants could indicate a “key person” for their hand 
pump. That person had some sort of leadership ability that could be used to gather the users and resolve 
maintenance issues. Both villagers and HCC staff talked about these leaders who have been important for 
the development initiatives in their villagers. I believe one can think of them as social entrepreneurs.  
In a book length presentation Krishna (2002), through a study of northern India, has showed the 
importance of leadership to see positive development result. His simple econometric analysis indicates that 
social capital is not enough to explain where development materializes or not, one needs also to include an 
agency variable. My interpretation of my primary data is that it is not that important if it is formal elected 
leaders such as Gram Panchayat members and leaders for committees, or people that just take initiative. 
The importance is the knowledge of the person and that he/she can lead by example. These people are of 
different ages and sexes. 
There is one advantage with having some reliance on informal leaders instead of only relating to elected 
leaders, and that is that informal leaders seems to have a positive effect on the transparency of the 
functioning of village management. The CHV themselves say that they go to Gram Sabha and ask Gram 
Panchayat how they use the funds.  
To support the people with leadership skills and to strengthen leadership capacity of the next generation 
could perhaps be as important as social capital for the sustainability of the development projects. 
Identifying these persons is of course best done with participatory methods such as PRA.  Even if one work 
with informal leaders one must be in hand with the Sarpanch at the same time. As reported Gram 
Panchayat members can oppose the work.  
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In summary, even when working through a participatory process active local leadership, formal or informal, 
are needed to transform social capital into positive change for the village. A “key person” acting as a social 
entrepreneur could be identified as an engine for village development. In many villages there are already 
persons with these capacities that just have to be identified and supported by the implementing 
organization.  
Social capital and leaders are affect rule compliance, but has the village the capacity for locally based 
maintenance? 
 
7.5 Maintenance capacity 
No village had previously the capacity to carry out maintenance of hand pumps. Both skills and tools were 
missing. Proper maintenance capacity is thus needed to be introduced in the village if it would be possible 
for the villagers to solve maintenance themselves. 
In five out of eight villages the local care taker/-s that HCC has trained quickly becomes responsible for 
maintenance of all the hand pumps present in the village and the village stops applying to the government 
for maintenance. This is a side effect of the HCC program not planned by HCC and according to Bhaskav this 
is nothing they endorse actively. The logic behind this behaviour is, as mentioned, that the people do not 
trust the government to provide support within reasonable time.  
The time the pumps are out of order during one incident of brake down is lowered to one or two days and 
the cost of the local reparations is seldom considered expensive if the pump is continuously maintained and 
the cost of this is shared among the beneficiaries. If if the goal is to maximize the water available to the 
people in one village it is a good practice for the village to take care of maintenance of all village pumps if 
the governments support does not arrive quickly enough. It lowers the number of days with malfunctioning 
of wells which means an increased income for the village. It would therefore be interesting to identify what 
factors determine the establishing of such practices. Four potential explanations to this are below 
compared to gathered primary data. 
A first explanation is that if it is Gram Panchayat that organizes maintenance it would lead to that the local 
caretaker takes care of all pumps. This is however not the case; for example Village V and Medshingi have 
Gram Panchayat involved in maintenance but do not organize local maintenance of all pumps. Bohuli do 
not organize maintenance through Gram Panchayat but have local maintenance of all pumps. 
One second, not too farfetched, hypothesis is that HCC pumps need to become a large share of the total 
level of pumps to stimulate village level maintenance of all pumps. In Narraj 4/7 of all pumps are HCC-
provided but they still do not organize village level maintenance of all pumps. And Umbergoum that has 
only 2 out of 21 pumps provided by HCC organize village level maintenance of all pumps. The hypothesis 
does not hold.  
It is the relation between village size and people trained that best explains, with only one exception 
(Narraj), why the practice of local maintenance of hand pump does not develop.  There must be enough 
people trained in relation to total number of bore wells for the practice to develop, see table 7.1.  
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Table 7.1 Analysis of maintenance capacity 
 Narraj Waki Village V Diksal Wuni 
Chinchale 
Medsingi Umborgum Bohuli 
Total 
local 
solution 
No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Nr of  
bore 
wells39 
Few Few Many Few Few Many Many Many 
People 
trained 
One One One One One One Several Several 
Payment 
for 
caretaker 
No Yes Yes Unknown Unknown Unknown Yes Yes 
Source: Appendix 2 
One could also suspect that the level of payment to the care taker could give some effect on what practice 
that evolves. Regretly complete data on this variable is not available (see table 7.1) so this could not be 
clarified.  Anyway, the data does not contradict the theory that a payment system must be introduced for 
the system with several people trained in one village to work. Both Umborgum and Bohuli use people with 
salaries paid by the Gram Panchayat. 
In a program implemented in Rajastan by a NGO the trained care many times was not utilised by the village 
(Manikutty, 1998, p. 384). Manikutty explain this as the Panchayats preferred to have its own staff doing 
the maintenance work. HCC has avoided this by establish a sound relation with the village Panchayats and 
also educated Gram Panchyat pions in situations when found suitable, and so resources are not wasted.   
In summary, to make it work the maintenance capacity must be sufficient. And it must be sufficient for the 
way the villagers choose to utilize it. The participatory process must thus identify the villagers demand for 
maintenance capacity and not see this as an issue that can be decided by an objective external part.  
But even the most well maintained pump will not supply water if there is no water in the well. Therefore 
some supplementing technology is also needed.  
 
7.6 Need of supplementing technology 
Even though the delimitations for this paper states that this aspect should not be in focus in this paper I 
need to mention it here. Approximately half of the studied villages experience problems with HCC-pumps 
not providing adequate water in summer. These pumps are in good working condition but the water table 
becomes too low in the summer months.  
This problem can be addressed directly by roof rain water harvesting directly connected to the well (see 
figure 7.1). This is already provided for the schools in Waki, Diksal and Umborgum (observation). The 
                                                            
39
 Few < 20, Many > 20 
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general effectiveness has been established by Narain (2006) and especially for the region studied in this 
paper by Baliram et.al who verified its effectivness (Baliram et.al 2007). 
  
 
Figure 7.1 Roof rain water harvesting at a school 
The pipes leads water through a filter directly to the bore well. 
 
Also indirect water harvesting structures such as check dams (see figure 7.2) and ”continues counter 
trenches” (see figure 7.3) recharge wells.  
 
  
Figure 7.2 Check dam  
Flooding water coming from the left will stop when it reaches the dam wall. This allows more water to 
percolate through the ground.  
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Figure 7.3 Continues counter trenches (CCT)  
Rain water will be stopped from flooding down the hill in the digged trenches. This allows for more water to 
percolate through the ground.   
This study has thus only identified the problem of low water table in summer and for a solution for 
sustainable drinking water management this must be addressed. As stated in the limitations I do not go into 
discussion about how to go about with such an extended program or what the result of HCC’s work in this 
area has been.  
In summary, even a large extent of the well constructed and well maintained bore wells become dry in 
summer.  Supplementing facilities such as roof water harvesting and continued counter trenches (CCT) is 
thus also needed to achieve sufficient water provision. An issue of natural resource management can never 
be solved without applying an ecological perspective, i.e. an awareness of that the way you utilize the 
resource affect other parts of your environment. 
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8. Conclusions  
The conclusion of this study is that if we look specifically at poor communities in the Indian countryside 
outside major villages a locally based management regime for drinking water provision (where users 
participate directly in management) is preferable in relation to a central government run solution
40
.  The 
Indian government has shown to lack the resources and capacity to maintain all hand pumps and when 
there is no large benefit of economies of scale it is better to have a smaller community take responsibility 
for their own hand pump
41
.  This is because a group of people in great need of the resource, and with the 
knowhow of how to manage repairs, will repair a malfunctioning part faster. This has also proven to be of 
rather low cost because of the simple technology used. 
This study shows that an external actor can use the knowledge developed by CPR theorists to develop local 
institutions that take care of a local public good. This said there are major difficulties in introducing this in a 
sustainable way indicated by the game theoretical idea of the prisoners’ dilemma. I come to the conclusion 
that the process of creating sustainable local management regimes has three major parts, these are:  
• Users participation from the beginning and right trough the project creates a feeling of ownership 
of the pump (even when the installation is largely subsidized). Local ownership is in turn the driving 
force for participation and active involvement in maintenance.  
 
• To make the system work a broader community mobilization effort is needed in order to build 
social capital in the villages. In this process there is a lot to gain from making room for the local 
leadership on different levels. There are “social entrepreneurs” that wants to work for the benefit 
of their community.  An important finding is also that in order for the new system to work not 
everyone within a community has to participate in management to be allowed to use the resource; 
the important thing is that the active group is large enough
42
.  
 
• Spreading awareness of how the technology should be used properly increase the lifetime of the 
equipment.  A demand driven approach also regarding how much maintenance capacity to supply 
would probably increase the impact of a program. Supplying training and equipment for 
maintenance is equally important as installing new wells if one look to the results in the long run. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
40
 Within larger villages other types of technology for water provision, such as pipelines and water towers, might prove more cost 
effective when economies of scale can be achieved. 
41
 This is when management and maintenance is concerned. If we look at installation of new wells there are large economics of 
scale.  
42
 My research method does not give any empirical evidence about what happens in the real long run. As commented on in the 
discussion in section 7.4.2 on page 51 I do suspect a lack of formal structure of the user group could have negative long run effects 
for the sustainability of these user groups.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Critical enabling factors for the sustainability of the commons 
 
Table A2:1 Critical enabling factors for the sustainability of the commons 
 
A. Resource system 
characteristics  
1. Small Size 
2. Well-defined boundaries 
3. Low levels of mobility 
4. Possibilities of storage of benefits from the resources 
5. Predictability 
B. Group characteristics 6. Small Size 
7. Clearly defined boundaries 
8. Shared norms 
9. Past successful experiences – social capital 
10. Appropriate leadership 
11. Interdependence among group members 
12. Heterogeneity of endowments of identities and interests 
13. Low levels of poverty 
A & B. Relationship 
between resource 
system characteristics 
and group 
characteristics 
  
14. Overlap between resource group residential location and resource 
location 
15. High levels of dependency by group members on resource system 
16. Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources 
17. Low levels of user demand 
18. Gradual change in levels of demand 
C. Institutional 
arrangements 
19. Rules are simple and easy to understand 
20. Locally devised access and management rules 
21. Graduated sanctions 
22. Availability of low cost adjudication 
23. Accountability of monitors and other officials to users 
A & C. Relationship 
between resource 
system characteristics 
and institutional 
arrangements 
24. Match restriction on harvest to regeneration of resources 
4. External 
environment 
 
25. Technology 
a) Low cost exclusion technology 
b) Time for adaptation to new technologies related to the 
commons 
26. Low levels of articulation with external markets 
27. Gradual change in articulation with external markets 
28. State: 
a) Central government should not undermine local authority 
b) Supportive external sanctioning institutions 
c) Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users 
for conservation activities 
d) Nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, 
governance 
Source: Agrawal 2001, p. 1659  
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Appendix 2: Data from the program village 
 
 
Table A.1 Bore well statistics 
 Narraj Waki Village V Diksal Wuni Chinchale Medsingi Umborgum Bohuli 
Nr of government 
hand pumps  
3 6 30 12 and all in main 
village. 
12 40 19 20 
Nr of HCC hand 
pumps 
4 4-6 6 2-3 Unknown 6 2 4 
Time since HCC 
pumps installed 
4 years  2 years 1,5 years 1 and 2 years 1,5 and 2 years 3 years 3 years 
Beneficiaries per 
hand pump 
500 200-300 30 600 students (240 of 
them with hostel 
facilities), 200 others 
150  200 - 300 150 70 
Source: Authors construction based on group interviews found in the reference list. 
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Table A.2 Condition before 
 Narraj Waki Village V Diksal Wuni Chinchale Medsingi Umborgum Bohuli 
Previous water 
source 
In village: 
• Pipe line 
 
Outside village: 
• Open well (with 
engine) (500 m) 
• Tanker in summer 
Outside village: 
• Open well  
• Bore well (500 m) 
• Tanker in summer 
In village: 
• Hand pumps  
• Taps 
 
Outside village: 
• Open well 
• Tanker  
In village: 
• Pipe line and water 
tower 
• Hand pump 
 
Outside village: 
• Open well 
• Tanker  
Outside village: 
• Open well 
• Tanker  
• Hand pump 
 
Outside village: 
• Open well (500 m) 
• Hand pump 
 
Outside village: 
• Open well (500 m) 
• Hand pump 
 
Outside village: 
• Open well (500 m, 
1000 m) 
 
Problem with 
precious water 
source 
• Well dry in 
summer 
• Tanker not 
reliable, waiting in 
line 
• Students coming 
one hour earlier to 
school to carry 
water 
• Pipe line service 
costly ( 2 lack 
rupees) 
• Conflict when 
tanker came, 
standing in line.  
• Required 
electricity 
• Less water with 
tanker, only 2-3 
days a week 
• Walk 500 m. for 
water 
 
• Open well get dry 
in summer. 
• Open well very 
deep, difficult to 
get water. 
• Water quality not 
good.  
• Government pipe 
line service 
expensive.  
• Government hand 
pump does not 
supply water in 
summer. 
• Open well deep in 
the summer, has 
been deadly 
accidents.  
• The chain of the 
government well 
close by is not 
working. 
 
• Water from open 
well of bad quality. 
• Government hand 
pump close is not 
working. 
• Open well 500 m 
away 
 
• Open well 500 m 
and 1000 m away 
 
What has changed? • Time saving, can 
spend time in 
other work. 
• Can choose when 
to collect water. 
• No dependency 
on electricity 
• Income increase 
for more time 
spend in 
agriculture 
 
• Drastic change in 
attitude o f people 
 • Have water closer 
• Cows are getting 
more milk which 
giver higher 
income (1-2 liters 
increase, 10- 
12 rupees/liter) 
  
Now used 
alternative 
• Pipe line in 
summer ( 
 • Pipe line in 
summer (see 
maintenance) 
 
• Carry water in 
from further away 
in summer.  
• Government 
scheme for two 
month  
• Open well when 
hand pump is 
temporarily 
malfunctioning  
 
• Open well for 
watering of 
animals in summer 
 
  
Source: Authors construction based on group interviews found in the reference list on. 
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Table A.3.1 Installation procedure 
 Narraj Waki Village V Diksal Wuni Chinchale Medsingi Umborgum Bohuli 
Who took initiative  • Elected members 
who saw their 
social 
responsibility, 
other people 
follow them. 
• Problem closely 
associated with 
their daily life so 
they participate 
happily 
 • HCC-staff initiated 
it, villagers were 
unaware before.  
• Gram Panchayat 
demanded from 
the government.  
• Demand from 
villagers also 
• Women after one 
women drowned 
in open well 
• Beneficiaries (not 
Gram Panchayat) 
• Initiative from 
women, women 
and men then 
went to Gram 
Panchayat. 
• One key person 
took initiative, 
knowledgeable 
man, no political 
man. 
 
Who took decision   • First central village 
meeting with the 
Gram Panchayat, 
then: 
• People living in the 
area decided 
during a meeting 
lead by HCC-staff 
 • Some discussion 
locally in the area 
and some in Gram 
Panchayat 
• HCC officers 
discussed with 
Gram Panchayat 
• Sarpanch came to 
the area and 
discussed with the 
villagers and they 
all agreed 
• Decided by all 
members 
 
Criteria for 
placement decision 
• Water availability 
• Center place 
• Preferable near 
road but not 
totally possible 
• Water availability 
• Need of the 
people 
• Common land 
• Need of the people 
• Water availability 
• Central place 
• Water availability 
• Close to school 
• Water availability 
• Need of people 
• Need of people 
(remote part) 
• Placing not 
important, need of 
water important 
• Not a controversy 
• A controversy, 
people demanded 
it to be closer to 
them (10-30% not 
happy). Issue 
settled by 
discussion not vote 
• Main point  
Source: Authors construction based on group interviews found in the reference list. 
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Table A.3.2 Installation procedure 
 Narraj Waki Village V Diksal Wuni Chinchale Medsingi Umborgum Bohuli 
Contribution • All come 
together,  10 
families  
• 3500 rupees, 10% 
(350 rupees per 
head) 
 
• Contributed sand 
• All people living 
here contributed 
10% together in the 
form of money plus 
labor.  
• Almost all 
contributed 
• Bricks and labor 
• One or two hours 
work each 
• Construction work 
• Stones etc. 
• 3500 rupees 
collected together 
• Say that some 
people are too 
poor to contribute 
• People give what 
they have; suppose 
I have a tractor… 
• So people who do 
not contribute to 
installation join 
later and 
contribute to 
maintenance  
• 3500 rupees 
• Whatever 
material needed.  
• Villagers and the 
school 
• Elected leaders 
collect the money, 
respect to their 
word. 
• 3500 rupees  
(10%) 
• Physical work 
• All people 
• Some contributed 
20 rupees, some 50 
rupees. 
 • 10% + work 
Who´s property • Privately owned 
land before 
• Property of the 
Gram Panchayat 
• Before public 
grazing land 
 • Public property, 
through Gram 
Panchayat 
    
Source: Authors construction based on group interviews found in the reference list. 
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Table A.4 Working conditions  
 Narraj Waki Village V Diksal Wuni Chinchale Medsingi Umborgum Bohuli 
User satisfied with 
HCC-pump 
Yes • Yes • Yes • Yes  • Yes • Yes, but 
dissatisfied that 
there is no road 
leading to the 
pump 
• Yes 
 
 
Need of 
maintenance of HCC 
pumps? 
  • No No • One problem in 
two years  (in 
summer) 
• General problems 
with parts (one 
example is given) 
• No   
Pumps working 
having enough water 
in summer 
• No 
 
• Yes  
 
• No 
 
• No 
 
• Yes • No 
 
• Yes 
 
 
Problem with quality 
of water 
• Salty     • Problem with salt 
according to 
translator from 
Sangola college  
  
Source: Authors construction based on group interviews found in the reference list. 
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Table A.5.1 Maintenance 
 Narraj Waki Village V Diksal Wuni Chinchale Medsingi Umborgum Bohuli 
Gram panchyat 
organize 
maintenance 
• No • Yes/No • Yes • Yes • No • Yes • Yes/No • No 
Water committee  • Yes   • Yes  • Yes  
Maintenance person 
call meeting 
• Yes • Yes • Yes  • No • No  • No 
Informal leader call 
meeting 
• No • No • No • No • Yes • No • Yes • Yes 
Village level or user 
group level funding 
• User group level • Village level • Village level • User group level 
(through Gram 
Panchayat) 
• User group level • User group level 
• Costly part 
through financed 
by Gram 
Panchayat 
• User group level • User group level 
Who contribute to 
the maintenance 
• The ten people 
(families), and 
some other 
people 
  • The users pay 
• 100-200 rupees so 
they can manage 
it 
• People living 
around contribute 
more 
• All people taking 
care, no fixed 
community 
• All beneficiaries 
contribute (no 
committee) 
 
• The beneficiaries 
• Also school 
teachers 
 
Nr of people trained • One (two) • One • One • One • One • One • Several • Several 
Gram Panchayat 
pion 
• No • No • Yes • No • No • No • Yes • Yes 
Who trained for 
maintenance 
• Middle aged man 
• Takes initiative all 
the time 
• Acts as some kind 
of social worker 
• Special man paid 
by the school for 
the school hand 
pump 
• Because he was 
interested in that 
field 
• Had the capacity 
 
• Gram Panchayat 
pion (full-time job) 
• Selected because 
of low salary 
demand. 
• A proper person 
according to 
villagers 
• A student aged 22. 
Now in Pune. 
• Eager person 
• Opinion he is 
eligible for that 
 
 • CHV 
• Gram Panchayat 
pions 
• One old man 
• One person and 
Gram Panchayat 
pions 
Source: Authors construction based on group interviews found in the reference list. 
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A.5.2 Maintenance 
 Narraj Waki Village V Diksal Wuni Chinchale Medsingi Umborgum Bohuli 
Payment for 
maintenance 
• No • 100-200 rupees 
per day from 
Gram Panchayat 
• Ready to work for 
less amount 
     
Time for 
maintenance now 
• 1-2 days  • In Hamlet one day 
because of the 
great need 
 • 10 days (in 
summer) 
Maintenance 
person not directly 
available 
   
Time for 
maintenance before 
   • Very long process 
• 2-3 month 
• Long process • 2 days  • Takes time 
Local maintenance 
of government 
pumps 
• No • Yes • No • Yes • Yes • No • Yes • Yes 
Maintenance 
solution before 
• Villagers went to Gram Panchayat who went to municipal who send repair team. 
Source: Authors construction based on group interviews found in the reference list. 
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Appendix 3: Data from the reference villages 
 
Table A.6 Basic facts of reference villagers 
 Itaki Hutakae Mangewalli 
Village size 786 1600 
Employment situation  • Goat rearing and agricultural laborers.  
• 75% migrate for 7 month 
• Many daily laborers 
• Many migrate 6-7 month 
 
Water situation 
Drinking water supply • Hand pump 
• Open well 
• Water tanker 
• Pipe line 
• Hand pump 
• Open well 
• Water tanker 
• Pipe line 
Nr of hand pumps 7 6 
Water conditions Not enough water in summer, then they use 
pipe line and water tankers. 
Not enough water in summer, then they use 
pipe line and water tankers. 
Satisfaction with their water 
situation 
Dissatisfied with the situation in summer and 
that there is no water management 
Dry area, so great need of more water.  
Water harvesting etc No, but application for water scheme has 
been made 
No 
Institutional setup of water supply 
How is water supply financed Through government. The village pays five 
rupees per 1000 l water through pipe line. 
They pay water tax, one for hand pump and 
one for pipe line. The tax is 500 rupees per 
year per family.   
How is maintenance solved? Through government, the village pays 900 
rupees/year. 
Government property, government does the 
maintenance.  
Estimated time for repairing  Eight days 1-2 month 
Working conditions now  There are bore well in need of maintenance 
Any rules about how to use the 
pump 
No No 
Decision about placement of hand 
pumps 
 Gram Panchayat and government. 
Government officials come to the village and 
said they would put three hand pumps.  
The village organization 
Gram Panchyat Now focusing on sanitation issue. GP meet twice a year and discuss “all issues”. 
“Of course women participate”. Not any 
special activities right now. 
Do they have Gram Sabha? No No 
Any locally decided rules? No No   
Other scheme for the village Starting to work in a sanitation scheme No 
Any groups in the village Three women’s groups (since 2 years) and 
youth groups (since 1 year). Started when the 
government told Gram Panchayat who formed 
the groups. Satisfied with one of the groups 
that “is a really good group”. 
No 
Occasions for meeting Festivals and cultural festivals. Festivals 
organized by village leaders (from Gram 
Panchayat and other male village leaders) 
 
Village property Gram Panchayat office and temple First said no (say they have a temple when 
directly asked) 
Who financed the temple All people (voluntarily gifts).  All people (voluntarily gifts) 
Who is responsible for taking care of 
the temple 
Village leaders ? 
Village development 
Involvement or knowledge about 
schemes available to them. 
Know about water schemes and hygiene and 
cleanness schemes. Has applied for schemes.  
 
Central government employment scheme. 
Important for this village for there is no other 
sources of income.  Don’t know about anything 
else. 
Contact with government BDO visits the village Letters to Gram Panchayat but Information not 
transferred to the rest of the village. 
Government representatives only come to the 
village on election time 
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Table A.6 Basic facts of reference villagers (continuation) 
 Itaki Hutakae Mangewalli 
People ask for • More drinking water  
• Better opportunities for education. 
• Individual improvements of income 
possibilities.  
• Education 
• Human rights 
• Drinking water 
Views on contribution for more hand 
pumps 
 They would pay water tax, today the tax is 500 
rupees per year per family.   
Source: Authors construction based on group interviews found in the reference list. 
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